EU-NATO Relations: Some General and Legal Considerations by Naert, Frederik
 NATO 
 
OTAN 
 
 
 
Issue 33 
March 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal Gazette 
NATO & EU 
Relations 
PAGE 2 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 
 
Contents 
  
Introduction, by Dr Petra Ochmannova………………………………………….. 3 
Collaborative Tools on CLOVIS: WORKSPACES, by Allende Plumed Prado…… 4 
Questions on the NATO Communications and Information Agency, by 
Simona Rocchi……………………………………………………………………………. 
 
7 
Focus Topics on NATO & EU Relationship  
• Practitioner’s Corner: The Relations and Interactions between NATO and EU, 
by Mette Prassé Hartov…..…………………………………………………………....... 
 
12 
• IGNORANTIA JURIS NON EXCUSAT:Analysis on the Compatibility of the NATO 
and EU Legal Regimes, by Cătălin Graure...………….……………………………..  
 
14 
• EU-NATO Relations: Some General and Legal Considerations, by Dr Frederik 
Naert……………………….……………………………………………………………..…. 
 
24 
• A Matter of Practice under International Institutional Law: NATO 
International Military Headquarters and Exemption From Residency and Visa 
in EU Legal Order, by Mette Prassé Hartov and Andres B. Munoz 
Mosquera…………………………………………………..………………………………. 
 
 
33 
• NATO and EU Military Cooperation, by Siegfried Dohr.………………………….  44 
Book Review, by Vincent Roobaert: 
• International Law and Classification of Conflicts, by Elizabeth Wilmshurst...... 
 
52 
Spotlight…………………………………………………………………………………….. 54 
Hail & Farewell……………………………………………………………………………... 58 
Upcoming Events of Legal interest…………………………………………………..… 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editor-in-Chief: 
Dr. Petra Ochmannova, ACT SEE Deputy Legal Adviser  
  Editors: 
 Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner, ACT SEE Legal Adviser  
 Galateia Gialitaki, ACT SEE Legal Assistant 
 Mette Prassé Hartov, HQ SACT Deputy Legal Adviser 
 Kathy Hansen-Nord, HQ SACT Legal Assistance Section Head 
 Copy Editors: 
 Andrew Rosati, ACT SEE Intern/NATO Practicum St. John’s University 
 Stanila Dimitrova, SHAPE Intern 
NATO LEGAL GAZETTE PAGE 3 
 
Introduction 
Dear Fellow Legal Professionals and those interested in NATO, 
Welcome to 2014. With great pleasure we are bringing you Issue 33 of the NATO 
Legal Gazette. The first of our four 2014 planned Gazettes’ issues is on NATO and EU 
relations.  
NATO and the EU each have 28 member nations. 22 of these nations are 
members of both organizations, while six members of each organization are not 
members of the other.1 This mixed representation naturally causes overlaps in the legal 
regimes that apply to some but not all of the NATO and EU members. 
In four different articles we present you with different points of view on NATO and 
EU relations. Firstly, Mr. Catalin Graure provides you an analysis of the compatibility of 
legal regimes surrounding both international organisations. Secondly, Dr. Frederik Naert 
provides you with an EU perspective on general and legal considerations related to EU 
and NATO relations. Thirdly, our NATO practitioners Ms. Mette Hartov and Mr. Andres 
Munoz describe the EU’s exemption of NATO International Military Headquarters from 
its residency and visa requirements. Finally, Mr. Siegfried Dohr provides an overview of 
NATO and EU cooperation from a military perspective. 
The interactions of NATO with the EU are not a matter of academic discussion but 
rather of significantly increasing practical importance. Under the new heading of 
“Practitioner’s Corner,” Ms. Mette Hartov kindly shares with us her reflections on current 
issues encountered in the NATO legal practice. We are fully aware of your need of a 
pragmatic approach towards a number of topics that you are addressing daily. For 
this reason, we are hoping to keep delivering to you future articles from a practitioner’s 
perspective. Please email me any topics that you would like to be covered in our 
upcoming issues. 
Please know that our plan is to publish Issue 34 in June. This Issue will discuss 
NATO’s legal cornerstones. I welcome from our readers any contributions you may wish 
to provide about the foundational and enduring legal regimes that arise from the 
Alliance’s key treaties and controlling legal regimes by 1 May 2014.  
Following our usual structure, this issue provides an article about a NATO 
organisation: Questions on NCI Agency; information about a CLOVIS feature called 
Workspace; a book review of International Law and the Classification of Conflicts; 
Spotlight introducing our new colleagues in NATO, hail & farewells and information 
about upcoming events. 
 
Sincerely yours,  
Petra Ochmannova, Deputy Legal Adviser ACT SEE  
                                                          
1 The NATO members that are not members of the EU are Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States. 
The EU members that are not members of NATO are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. 
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Collaborative Tools on CLOVIS: WORKSPACES 
 
By Allende Plumed Prado 
ACT SEE Legal Office 
 
One of the constant challenges that NATO faces is how to effectively connect 
and communicate within a segmented command structure. The unique variety of 
tools available on CLOVIS, such as Workspaces bridging and linking the NATO legal 
community, is helping to ease this challenge. 
What is a Workspace?  
“Workspace” is a 2010 SharePoint collaborative feature at the disposal of the 
NATO legal community. It provides spaces with controlled-access for active work on 
any NATO legal document or project between colleagues who may be in a single 
office or different countries or continents.  
Who has access to it?  
Depending on the project, access to workspaces can either be open to all 
CLOVIS users or restricted to certain groups and available only upon invitation. It is also 
possible to grant members of one workspace different permissions (read, contribute, 
etc.)  
How to use it?  
Users are invited to contribute to any of the public workspaces available. 
Generally, anyone interested in working on a project with another legal office, or 
wanting to collect comments on a particular project or draft from the whole legal 
community can request the CLOVIS team members to set up a specific workspace. 
Contacts for the CLOVIS team members can be found under the “Contact Us” tab on 
the menu bar. 
What do Workspaces offer?  
Workspaces offer a place for multiple people to work together on a particular 
project. As such it offers a wide range of helpful features, including:  
Calendar: which can be connected to Microsoft Outlook, meaning users can 
set up alerts on tasks and arrange meetings with colleagues through this means.  
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Shared documents repository: Users can 
store all their draft materials and final products in 
the workspace’s shared documents library. 
Documents are thus instantly available to every 
user participating in the workspace, and version 
control and history is guaranteed. Version control 
is a critical feature that saves every version of a 
document at any time. This allows for multiple 
people to make changes to a document without 
the fear of overwriting a previous version. If 
necessary, users can always revert to previous 
document versions. Pictures and presentations 
can also be uploaded and shared.  
Task list: This feature enables users to distribute tasks among the workspace 
members, as well as monitor the progress and contribution. 
Team Discussions: In order to better communicate with other workspace 
members at any time, a team discussion function can be set up to allow for internal 
discussions. 
In addition to these features, 
Workspaces users can easily consult official 
NATO documents or related reference 
material whilst navigating through the 
portal. 
It is also worth mentioning that CLOVIS 
is available from every internet connection, 
meaning Workspaces can also be used and 
accessed on TDY. Workspaces is therefore 
the equivalent of an “electronic desk”, 
where all the documents needed are 
accessible in a click.  
In addition to Workspaces, there are other tools available to the NATO Legal 
Community on CLOVIS and which are meant to facilitate communication and 
collaboration. These include: 
Forum: For legal personnel posted in NATO, CLOVIS offers a “Forum” device. The 
aim is to encourage the NATO Legal Community to increase collaboration, and share 
legal opinions and experiences. It can be accessed by clicking on « CLOVIS Forum » 
on the left hand side navigation of the home page. To create a new post, users simply 
need to click on « Create a post », fill in the form and click on « Publish ». Users should 
ensure they give a title to their post in order for others to easily identify the theme of 
the conversation and participate in it. It is also possible for users to comment on 
another person’s post by clicking on its title, scrolling down, adding their comment, 
and submitting it. 
Colleague Finder: This feature offers the ability to search for an expert on any 
given issue within the NATO Legal Community and to connect qualified NATO legal 
experts with one another. 
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In conclusion, CLOVIS encourages its users to exploit these collaborative tools, 
with a special emphasis on Workspaces, so as to keep records of what the NATO legal 
community is doing. The ultimate goal is to build a better institutional memory and 
avoid having to constantly reinvent the wheel.  
 
 
 
www.nato.int 
 
 
NATO LEGAL GAZETTE PAGE 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.nato.int 
Questions on the NATO Communications and Information 
Agency 
 
 By Simona Rocchi1 
What does NCI Agency stand for? 
The NATO Communications and Information Agency, or NCI Agency, was 
established on 1 July 2012 by merging the NATO Consultation, Command and Control 
Agency (NC3A); the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) Management 
Agency (NACMA); the NATO Communication and Information System (CIS) Services 
Agency (NCSA); the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) 
programme; and elements of the NATO Headquarters Information, Communication 
and Technology Management (ICTM) directorate.  
The creation of the NCI Agency is part of the agency reform called for by the 
Lisbon Summit Declaration in 2010. The General Manager of the NCI Agency is Major 
General Koen Gijsbers, RNLA (Ret.). The agency’s headquarters is located in Brussels 
with main offices in Mons and Glons in Belgium, and The Hague in the Netherlands. In 
addition, the NCI Agency has over 30 other locations in Europe, North America and 
Afghanistan in support of customers and NATO operations, with a staff of ca. 2,900, 
half military, and half civilians.  
The NCI Agency is responsible for command, control, communications, 
consultation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems “from 
cradle to grave” and is set to achieve rationalisation and efficiencies. The C4ISR 
collaboration among nations with the agency both on a bilateral and multilateral level 
is a key element of the NCI Agency. Such collaborations represent important 
opportunities for NATO to develop less expensive solutions and to achieve better 
interoperability for NATO’s and the nations’ CIS systems.  
                                                          
1 Simona Rocchi is the Legal Adviser of the NCI Agency. The NCI Agency Legal Office also comprises lawyers Kerstin Mueller, 
Vincent Roobaert, Jean-Luc Prevoteau, and Assistants Dominique Palmer-De Greve and Greg Rohel. The views expressed in 
this article are solely those of the author and may not represent the views of NATO. 
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What is the legal framework?  
NCI Agency is a NATO body established under the Charter for the NATO 
Communications and Information Organization (NCIO) as of 1 July 2012. All NATO 
nations are members of the NCIO. The NCIO constitutes an integral part of NATO: it 
shares in the international personality of NATO as well as the juridical personality of 
NATO under Article IV of the Ottawa Agreement.2 The NCIO is composed of the 
Agency Supervisory Board (ASB) and its executive body (NCI Agency) composed of a 
General Manager and his staff.  
The North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) has granted authority to the 
NCIO to conclude agreements in 
the name of NATO (e.g. with NATO 
or non-NATO Nations) and to 
conclude administrative agreements 
with other NATO bodies (e.g. with 
other NATO agencies). However, 
before concluding any agreement 
or contract involving (a) a nation not 
being a member of NATO; (b) an 
agreement or contract with an 
international organisation; or (c) any international agreement requiring Parliamentary 
approval by a NATO nation, the NCIO needs to obtain prior approval of the NAC. By 
delegation of the NAC, the NCIO is authorised:  
• To conclude agreements within the scope of its agreed mission and 
activities, subject to prior clearance by the NATO Office of Security, with nations that 
have received authorisation by the NAC to contribute to NATO-led operations or 
nations that have a partnership programme with NATO such as the Partnership for 
Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; and 
• To let contracts in nations that are not members of NATO for those 
initiatives under the NATO/PfP Trust Fund Policy led by a NATO nation and for which 
the NCI Agency is the Executing Agent.  
What are the main missions of the NCI Agency? 
The number one priority for the NCI Agency is supporting NATO operations and 
ensuring optimal connectivity between all the different services involved, wherever 
they are in the world. Several programmes have been defined as vital. For instance, 
the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which aims to improve 
alliance cyber capabilities, is high on the priority list. The NCI Agency is also responsible 
for the provision of technical and operational cyber security services throughout 
NATO.  
 
                                                          
2 Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and 
International Staff signed in Ottawa, 20 September 1951. 
NA
 
NCI
 
ASB 
NATO LEGAL GAZETTE PAGE 9 
 
The NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Programme is focused on the upgrade, 
test and integration of NATO’s Command and Control (C2) systems and underlying 
communication network between various NATO and national missile defence systems. 
This will create a larger range of detection, communication and missile defence 
capabilities for NATO forces and NATO populations and territories. NATO’s long-term 
goal is to merge missile defence assets provided by individual Allies into a coherent 
defence system so that full coverage and protection for all NATO European 
populations, territory and forces against the threats posed by proliferation of ballistic 
missiles is ensured. Another of the agency’s priorities is the NATO Air Command and 
Control System (ACCS) programme which is intended to combine and automate, at 
the tactical level, the planning and tasking and execution of all air operations. Also 
high on the agency’s priority list is modernising NATO’s information technology 
infrastructure. The aim is to bring NATO into one single enterprise information system 
supporting multiple levels of security. 
In fact, 7 out of 11 Lisbon Summit critical capabilities commitments fall under the 
responsibility of the NCI Agency (Afghan Mission Network, Counter-IED (Improvised 
Explosive Devices), BMD, Cyber Defence, Automated Information Systems, ACCS, Joint 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).  
What does customer funding mean to me/my organisation?  
The NCI Agency is on its way to becoming completely customer funded. 
Customer funding is a system of compensation for work performed where the entity 
performing the effort is paid on a project or task basis. The aim is to achieve greater 
clarity on the Programme of Work, to realise cost efficiencies and overall to have 
greater business transparency and accountability. By the beginning of 2014 the 
agency will have gone from budget funding for two-thirds of the agency to customer 
funding for the entire agency. Customer funding requires the agency to attract work 
from its customers, to be flexible and to expand quickly or reduce workforce (or to use 
external contractors where necessary) depending on the Agency workload. This will 
ensure a fast response to customer demand, but will also require flexible workforce 
management. In addition to the military commands and NATO HQ (such as the NSIP 
programme), the NCI Agency also provides support to NATO, non-NATO nations and 
international organisations, in compliance with its charter.  
The NCI Agency is, for example, providing CIS services to many nations that 
have deployed troops in Afghanistan. This support covers the provision of service and 
capabilities in the area of C4ISR. In order to facilitate this support, many nations have 
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on C4ISR cooperation. This is a 
framework agreement containing the general terms covering the cooperation, which 
is supplemented by technical arrangements detailing the technical and financial 
aspects of a specific project. The NCI Agency is also involved in various multinational 
projects, such as MAJIIC (Multi-Sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Interoperability Coalition) and the recently 
signed multinational projects on cyber defence.  
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During the first year of the NCI Agency, over 130 agreements with nations were 
concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Examples of activities covered under 
NCI Agency agreements include CIS support for nations involved in the ISAF operation, 
support to exercises, multi-year programme of work, and training support. 
Legal Office of NCI Agency 
The Legal Adviser of the NCI Agency provides legal advice to all elements of the 
NCI Agency (the General Manager, the Commanders and the Directors) and to the 
Agency Supervisory Board. The Legal Office deals with a large variety of legal topics: it 
drafts, negotiates and manages all agreements; provides support to Human 
Resources, Acquisition and the various elements of the agency; manages contractual 
disputes and arbitration with contractors; manages export control and license 
agreements; ensures compliance with the standard of conduct; manages staff 
member complaints and appeals; manages the Agency regulatory framework and 
provides support to operations (including training and exercises).  
The on-going rationalisation of structures and services which will be followed by 
an optimisation phase in 2014 presents challenges, but also opportunities and our goal 
is to assist in the change process whilst preserving the mission and mandate of the NCI 
Agency. Legal issues are often easier to prevent than to cure and we therefore 
encourage our staff to seek legal advice early on, before problems become 
unmanageable.  
What are the main legal challenges within the next 12 months? 
As the NCI Agency will be working closely with member nations and their 
industries to link national and NATO goals and solutions, the legal office will continue to 
be heavily involved in setting up the legal framework for C4ISR cooperation with 
nations and partners.  
In order to enhance the cyber defence of NATO’s networks and to bring industry 
best practices into the NCI Agency, the legal office is currently establishing a legal 
framework for a cyber defence information exchange with industry, similar to the 
framework established by the US Department of Defence. Legal participation in 
training and exercises as in the recent cyber exercise Lockshield organised by NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), will continue to 
be on the legal office’s agenda.  
With regard to support to operations, the coming challenge will be the transition 
from ISAF to Resolute Support and the disposal of CIS assets from the theatre of 
operations in Afghanistan. 
From an industry acquisition perspective, the new agency now provides a single 
entry point for businesses seeking to provide C4ISR systems to NATO. The NCI Agency 
effectively becomes a single acquisition organisation and the legal office will continue 
its support throughout the whole entity to ensure the proper application of acquisition 
rules. This will include the continued training and guidance on the NCI Agency code of 
conduct and also the elaboration of an internal programme on anti-fraud/corruption.  
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The Legal Office will continue to be heavily involved in the discussions with Host 
Nation Belgium on Privileges and Immunities for all civilian Agency staff members in 
Mons and Glons. 
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Practitioner’s corner: The Relations and Interactions between 
NATO & EU 
By Mette Prassé Hartov1  
The relations and interactions between NATO and EU, as well as NATO and EU 
Nations have notably increased over the past 20 years. NATO’s webpage documents 
the developments in the NATO-EU relations, from Maastricht via Petersberg and to 
Lisbon and Chicago, and the list is significant. Most recently the principles for 
collaboration between NATO and EU were restated at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 
2012, and the strategic partnership between NATO and EU is embedded in NATO 
Strategic Concept. 
The NATO webpage records a development in the relations from high-level 
statements to staff talks and initiatives to join forces in common areas such as cyber 
and capability development. Apart from regular high-level meetings, permanent 
military liaison arrangements have been established to facilitate cooperation at the 
operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU 
Military Staff since 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE in 2006. 
From the perspective of a NATO Legal Practitioner this raises a number of rather 
practical yet also policy driven staffing requirements: Legal arrangements have to be 
put in place to effectively support a liaison mission at SHAPE and within the EU Military 
Staff. The lack of status or access to workspaces and colleagues is not helpful if an 
effective relationship is being sought. Similarly, when operating side by side or 
consecutively in missions (such as in the Balkans), these relationships have to be 
developed to support interaction, allocation of missions, and relocation. 
These matters are being addressed in the context of NATO status and mission 
agreements and in Headquarters Agreements, and at the current level of interaction it 
appears that NATO and the EU have been overall successful in this endeavour. We 
have yet to find out, how the EU Status of Forces Agreement (not yet in force) may 
reside with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement – and vice versa, should there be an 
exercise or event, in which they both apply. These are all issues that will be addressed 
at the adequate political and strategic level.  
At the practical level the question of status does occur from time to time, 
particularly when the EU or EU / Non-NATO Nations take part in NATO activities either 
led directly by NATO Nations or by NATO. If such an activity is led by a Supreme 
Headquarters (or its subordinate commands) the issue of status will be addressed 
either bilaterally or in the relevant exercise documents and be tabled in the planning 
process. Such matters will always need to be assessed in close dialogue with (and 
lead of) the NATO Nation hosting the event, since the Supreme Headquarters depend 
on the support of the Host Nation and on the requirement to obtain the consent of the 
Host Nation to allow and facilitate the presence of foreign forces and international 
                                                          
1 Deputy Legal Adviser at NATO Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Office of the 
Legal Adviser. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not represent the 
views of NATO. 
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organisations in its territory.  
The staffing at the Strategic Level starts, however, even before issuing an 
invitation: the stated policy of NATO, as an alliance to work with the EU, sets the 
mission of the Supreme Headquarters, but the Headquarters are also required to 
obtain the approval of NATO Nations before opening NATO education, training, and 
exercises at a NATO Training Facility to the EU (and other non-NATO entities). Per 
definition, this extends to training, education, and exercises conducted by HQ SACT, 
SHAPE, or by NATO Education and Training Facilities, within or outside the NATO 
Command Structure. This requirement is stated in MC 458/2 (NATO Education, Training, 
Exercise and Evaluation Policy, October 2009).  
The policy applies to NATO Command Structure Entities, NATO Force Structure, 
and to NATO Education and Training Facilities, as well as to individuals from NATO 
Nations and from Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations. In short, the Policy establishes 
the roles and responsibilities for NATO education, training, exercises and evaluation. 
The Policy identifies the value of including Non-NATO Entities in NATO training and 
exercises. The authority to include Partners, other (non-NATO) Governmental 
Organisations, International Organisation, and Contractors is retained by the Military 
Committee and the North Atlantic Council, and the entities to which MC 458/2 apply 
are required to seek Military Committee approval and North Atlantic Council 
endorsement of the participation of such Non-NATO Entities even before dialogue is 
initiated with the entity. Approval and endorsement are achieved either through the 
approval of the annual Bi-Strategic Command NATO Military Training and Exercise 
Programme (MTEP) or by ad hoc approval.  
The requirements of MC 458/2 raise several issues which Legal Advisers, no 
matter where posted, have to take account of when NATO interacts with the EU or 
other Non-NATO Entities. This issue of the NATO Legal Gazette provides details as to the 
relations between NATO and EU in operations and related relations; the Gazette 
provides examples of NATO and EU military cooperation and the compatibility of the 
legal regimes of EU and NATO as a matter of international institutional law. The 
Gazette sets the relations between international institutions in a practical perspective, 
but as Legal Advisers we also need to be equally mindful of other decisions directing 
the course of engaging with Non-NATO Entities, and assist the staff in identifying the 
associated requirements and thus remain compliant with the directions given by the 
Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council. 
 
 www.nato.int 
PAGE 14 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 
 
IGNORANTIA JURIS NON EXCUSAT: Analysis of the Compatibility 
of the NATO and EU Legal Regimes 
By Cătălin Graure1 
Introduction 
The development of the European Union (EU) towards a federalist structure 
along with its ever-increasing prerogatives in various fields, after being endowed with 
many domestic and external powers, may sometimes lead to an apparent conflict of 
obligations for Member States towards the EU or under various other international 
regimes that they have individually acceded to. Some of these concerns may involve 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a great majority of its Member States 
is also part of the EU. 21 of the 28 NATO Member States are also members of the EU 
which brings out a debate on the relationship between the EU legal order and that of 
NATO. 
The essential point under this scenario is to determine how an EU Member State 
has to proceed with its NATO treaty obligations and to comply with EU law. 
As far as the NATO legal regime is concerned, it mainly consists of the 1949 North 
Atlantic Treaty2 (NAT), the 1951 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces3 (NATO SOFA), the 1951 Agreement of the 
Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and 
International Staff4 (Ottawa Agreement), the 1952 Protocol on the Status of 
International Military Headquarters (IMHQs) set up Pursuant to the North Atlantic 
Treaty5 (Paris Protocol), the 1995 Agreement among the States Parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the Partnership for peace 
regarding the Status of their Forces6 (PfP SOFA), the 1997 Further Additional Protocol to 
the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other 
States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces7 
(FAP) and various supplementary agreements concluded between the organisation 
and some of its Member States. On the other hand, the EU legal framework consists of 
                                                          
1 Legal Intern (March-July 2013), SHAPE Legal Office; PhD Candidate, Sorbonne Law School.  
I would like to thank Andrés Munoz Mosquera, Mette Prasse Hartov, Nikoleta Chalanouli and Natalie Dobson for 
their invaluable comments and support in writing this contribution.  
 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 
opinion or position of SHAPE, HQ SACT, or NATO.  
2 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm?.  
3 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, London, 19 
June 1951, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm?. 
4 Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International 
Staff signed in Ottawa, Ottawa, 20 September 1951, available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17248.htm?. 
5 Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Paris, 28 
August 1952, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17300.htm?. 
6 Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the 
Partnership for peace regarding the Status of their Forces, Brussels, 19 June 1995, available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24742.htm?.  
7 Further Additional Protocol to the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other 
States participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces, 19 December 1997, available 
at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25435.htm?.  
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the founding treaties, currently consolidated in the form of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and of the 
secondary law adopted by its bodies.  
The debate regarding the compatibility of NATO treaty obligations and EU law is 
to be addressed by reference to relevant provisions within the NATO and EU treaties. 
Considering the NAT, its Article 8 is intended to solve any potential conflict of 
obligations, whereas Articles 351 TFEU and 42 TEU have a similar function within the EU 
framework.  
First of all, Article 42 TEU establishes a general exemption from EU laws to 
Member States’ obligations under the NATO security and defence policy. Second, the 
fulfillment of NATO obligations on security and defence can only be seen from a 
broad perspective in accordance with the areas covered in the NATO governing 
treaties (e.g. relief for IMHQs from duties and taxes; the import by members of a force 
or civilian component free of duty of their private motor vehicles, etc.); areas that are 
or can be regulated by EU treaties or secondary law. Therefore, any attempt to 
deplete the NATO treaty obligations on security and defence by EU law implementers 
through secondary law provisions is clearly against both the NATO and EU regimes.  
 
www.nato.int 
The NATO Primacy Regime under the North Atlantic Treaty  
The NAT is the founding document of NATO although the text does not 
specifically mention the creation of a new international organisation. However, Article 
9 reads that “[t]he Parties hereby establish a Council [...] to consider matters 
concerning the implementation of this Treaty,” that “shall set up such subsidiary bodies 
as may be necessary.” 
The NAT also contains a supremacy clause creating for the NAT its own conflict-
of-laws regime, somewhat similar to Article 103 of the UN Charter, regarding past, 
present and future third engagements in favour of obligations of the parties arising 
from the NAT. According to Article 8 of the NAT, [e]ach Party declares that none of the 
international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or 
any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to 
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enter into any international engagements in conflict with this Treaty.8 
To meet the goals of the organisation, the member states later understood the 
need to complement the provisions of the NAT with the provisions such as the ones 
regarding the forces of one Party sent to serve in the territory of another Party (NATO 
SOFA) or concerning the status of International Military Headquarters (IMHQs enjoying 
status under the Paris Protocol). Such treaties derive from the provisions of the NAT 
and, as long as they are in force, it can be reasonably assumed that the NAT conflict 
clause equally applies to all Member State obligations under such agreements.  
The provisions of Article 351 TFEU  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)9 explicitly considers 
the situation of pre-existent treaty obligations to Member States of the EU and their 
effects under the EU legal order. Article 351 TFEU (ex Article 307 TEC) provides that: 
[t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 
or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more 
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall 
not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties.  
Article 351 TFEU further mentions that: 
[t]o the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the 
Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other 
to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.  
As the EU has separate international legal personality,10 it is not bound by any 
agreements concluded by its Member States, such as the NATO related treaties and 
agreements and therefore, it is ultimately a Member State’s duty to ensure its 
compliance with its prior international obligations.  
Before the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, Article 307 TEC represented the 
only means of protection of the NATO regime against any potential intrusion on the 
part of the European Community. At the same time, such shielding was under the 
scrutiny of the Court in Luxembourg that continuously limited the scope of the 
provision, in order to favour the supremacy of the European legal order.  
According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) the provisions of 
an agreement concluded prior to a Member State's accession cannot be relied on in 
intra-Community relations if the rights of non-member countries are not involved.11 
Furthermore, on the appeal of the Kadi case,12 the CJEU considered the applicability 
                                                          
8 This provision was added at the initiative of the United States and its rationale was explained by Dean Acheson, 
US Secretary of State, at his meeting with Senators Connally and Vandenberg on February 3, 1949. According to 
Acheson, the US had in mind “the possibility that one of these countries might go Communist and some ground 
should be provided for disassociating them from the pact” (Memorandum of Feb. 3, 1949, written by Bohlen and 
signed by Acheson. Department of State, file No. 840.20/2-349; in E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of 
The North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, McClelland and Steward, 1977, p. 212.  
9 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 
2007, 2008/C 115/01. 
10 Article 47 TEU.  
11 C-286/82 Ministère Public v Deserbais [1988], para. 18; Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis 
Eirean (RTE) and Independent Television Publications v Commission [1995], para. 84.  
12 C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi [2008] ECR I-6351.  
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of Article 351 TFEU in its ruling and stated that the article, while allowing for derogation 
from primary law,13 “may in no circumstances permit any challenge to the principles 
that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order.”14 
On the other hand, the same Court held that as a matter of principle current 
Article 351 TFEU implies “a duty on the part of the institutions of the Community not to 
impede the performance of the obligations of Member States which stem from a prior 
agreement.”15 
The applicability of Article 351 TFEU with regard to NATO 
The founding treaties of NATO were concluded prior to January 1958. 
Furthermore, the other EU Member States that are part of NATO ratified the NATO 
agreements prior to their EU accession. Therefore, the current EU and NATO members 
had international obligations under the NATO founding treaties either before 1 January 
1958 or before their accession to the EU, as provided by Article 351 TFEU. While we 
might be tempted to question the status of the anterior treaty of the PfP SOFA, FAP 
and Supplementary Agreements in Europe, it is unquestionable that these were only 
intended to ensure the functioning of an international organisation already shaped in 
1949, 1951 and 1952, that is aimed to exercise the right of collective self defence in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.   
The question of whether the obligations could only be owed to a third country 
and not to an international organisation is not specifically dealt with, as the article only 
mentions the type of signatories to the treaties (“[...] agreements concluded [...] 
between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third 
countries on the other”) and does not address the issue of international organisations. 
However, there is nothing indicating that the drafters intended to exclude the 
applicability of the text to agreements establishing international organisations that 
equally provide for obligations of the Member States towards the organisation. 
Furthermore, the NATO nations who are members of the EU have consolidated by 
practice the “cohabitation” of the NATO and EU regimes without mutual exclusion, 
ensuring their independence and autonomy as international organisations with 
separate legal personality. 
The way this provision has been applied, in order to ensure the NATO special 
status, can be illustrated by following the subsequent practice within the European 
Community that shows the understanding of specific obligations owed to NATO. As an 
example of this NATO special status, the 1977 VAT European Council Directive16 
establishes that:  
Member States shall exempt [...] importation of goods into the territory of 
Member States which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty by the armed forces of 
other States which are parties to that Treaty for the use of such forces or the civilian 
staff accompanying them or for supplying their messes or canteens where such forces 
                                                          
13 Idem., para. 301. 
14 Idem., para. 304. 
15 Case 812/79,  Attorney General v Burgoa [1980], ECR 2787, para. 9. 
16 The legislation currently applicable to VAT within the EU is the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 
2006 on the common system of value added tax. The Directive provides for the same kind of exemptions for 
NATO under its articles 22, 143.1(h) and 151.1(c) and (d).  
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take part in the common defence effort.17 
The 1977 text further exempted the “supply of goods and services [...] effected 
within a Member State which is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and intended 
either for the use of the forces of other States which are parties to that Treaty or of the 
civilian staff accompanying them, or for supplying their messes or canteens when such 
forces take part in the common defence effort.”18 
The scope of the VAT exemption for NATO under the current 2006/112/EC VAT 
Directive19 has recently been addressed by the CJEU by means of a preliminary 
ruling.20 The request was made by the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) in 
a case concerning the dismantling by Able UK Ltd on UK soil of thirteen obsolete ships 
which were in the service of the United States Navy. The proceedings opposed Able 
UK Ltd to The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
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The issue had previously been addressed by the First-tier Tribunal judge who 
established that the scope of Article 151.1(c) of the VAT Directive21 was not limited to 
“NATO visiting forces” parting from a textual interpretation of the Article and 
concluding that there was “no policy reason for limiting the exemption under Article 
151.1(c) to visiting forces stationed in the Member State.”22 On the other hand, the 
CJEU concluded that Article 151.1(c) only exempted services supplied to the forces to 
another Member State if such forces “are taking part in the common defence effort” 
and if those armed forces “are stationed in or visiting the Member State concerned.”23 
Accordingly, in this particular case the appeal was allowed by the national Court, as 
the Respondent (Able UK Ltd) confirmed it had no interest in defending the appeal 
following the decision of the CJEU.24 
                                                          
17 Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, Art. 14(1)(g).  
18 Idem., Art. 15(10).  
19 The interpretation requested to the CJEU concerns the scope of Article 151.1(c) of the Directive.  
20 C-225/11, The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Able UK Ltd [2012]. 
21 This article reads as follows: “Member States shall exempt the following transactions: the supply of goods and 
services within a Member State which is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, intended either for the armed forces 
of other States party to that Treaty for the use of those forces, or of the civilian staff accompanying them, or for 
supplying their messes or canteens when such forces take part in the common defence effort.” 
22 First Tier Tribunal Tax, Able UK Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Appeal Number: 
MAN/2008/1497, 30 October 2009, para. 31. 
23 See supra note 20, paras. 20-27.   
24 Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber, The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Able 
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Such a position may prove hazardous for NATO’s special regime, as the CJEU 
interpreted restrictively the exemption provided for the organisation parting from the 
sole interpretation of Article 8(1) of the Paris Protocol. One could question any de 
facto CJEU authority to interpret the NATO governing treaties in matters as specific as 
what is “common defence effort” or armed forces “stationed in or visiting the Member 
State concerned.” 
A different example is provided by the 1992 Council Directive on the 
arrangement for products subject to excise duty.25 The Directive specified that: 
Products subject to excise duty shall be exempted from payment of excise duty 
where they are intended [...] for the armed forces of any State party of the North 
Atlantic Treaty other than the Member State within which the excise duty is 
chargeable [...], for the use of those forces, for the civilian staff accompanying them 
or for supplying their messes or canteens.26 
Thirdly, the EU has added specific language to the 2006 Schengen Borders 
Code27 in order to ensure the respect of Article III of the NATO SOFA which exempts 
the members of the visiting forces from passport, visa and immigration control, on the 
condition that they hold a specific movement order and their personal identity card. 
According to Annex VII of the Schengen Borders Code, “[i]n view of the special 
privileges and immunities they enjoy, the holders of [...] documents issued by the 
international organisations listed in point 4.4 who are travelling in the course of their 
duties, may be given priority over other travellers at border crossing points even 
though they remain, where applicable, subject to the requirement of visa.”28  
Point 4.4 of the Annex goes into details and specifically mentions the documents 
issued pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of the NATO SOFA, as well as documents 
issued in the framework of the Partnership for Peace.  
In addition to these examples, the primacy of the NATO legal regime was 
explicitly addressed by the EU Member States in the basic treaties (Article J.4(4) of the 
Maastricht Treaty). Consequently, NATO countries that are also part of the EU have 
currently incorporated the necessary and minimum wording in Article 42 TEU, further 
discussed below, to ensure that their obligations vis-à-vis NATO are not invaded by the 
principle of “EU law primacy”. This is to avoid any temptation of renegotiating or 
denouncing any prior agreements related to the NATO common security and 
defence framework.  
The CFSP and Article 42 TEU 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has its major role in defining the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
UK Limited, [2013]UKUT 0318(TCC), available at: 
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/hmrc-v-Able-UK-ltd.pdf.  
25 Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to excise 
duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products. The Directive was repealed by Council 
Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty which 
maintains the same exemption for NATO. 
26 Idem., Article 23(1).  
27 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code).  
28 Idem., Annex VII, point 4.1.  
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interactions between EU and NATO and establishing a general exemption clause for 
all common defence actions of Member States realized within the framework of NATO.  
The CFSP theme was initially formulated in April 1990, by German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand. According to their letter sent to 
the Irish Presidency of the European Council (EC), the Council was requested to hold 
an intergovernmental conference having as one of the objectives to “define and 
implement a common foreign and security policy”.29 
Consequently, the CFSP is first embodied in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
or Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and which came into force on 1 
November 1993. Article B of Title I (Common Provisions) specifies among the objectives 
of the Union “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence.” 
Title V of TEU elaborates on the CFSP. Under these provisions, the EU was 
intended to acquire a stronger role in international security matters. Under Article J.4(2) 
of the Treaty, the EU requests the WEU, as “an integral part of the development of the 
Union,” to “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications.” Under the same Article, there is a provision crucial to the 
debate at hand, meant to settle the issue of a potential incompatibility between the 
newly envisaged EU legal regime in matters of defence and the NATO legal 
framework already in place. According to Article J.4(4), the harmonisation of the two 
legal regimes is ensured by providing that the policy of the Union in accordance with 
its CFSP: 
“[s]hall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy 
of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States 
under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and 
defence policy established within that framework.” 
This provision, currently under Article 42 of the consolidated version of the TEU30, is 
further strengthened by the objectives of the CFSP as outlined in Article 21 of the TEU. 
Accordingly, the EU “shall work [...] in order to [...] consolidate and support the 
principles of international law”31 and one of the cornerstone principles under 
international law is the principle of pacta sunt servanda. According to this principle, 
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith. However, this principle is not only applicable with regard to the CFSP but 
also concerns the entire functioning of the EU as Article 3(5) of the TEU stipulates that 
the Union “shall contribute [...] to the strict observance and development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”  
                                                          
29 Letter by the German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand to 
the Irish Presidency of the EC, 19 April 1990, source: Agence Europe, 20 April 1990.  
30 Current Article 42(2) TEU reads as follows: “[t]he policy of the Union [...] shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common 
security and defence policy established within that framework.” 
31 TEU, Article 21(2)(b).  
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At the same time, Annex 14 to the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that “the provisions 
covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External 
Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of 
each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its 
national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in 
international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the Security 
Council of the United Nations.”32 
Accordingly, the EU has to ensure that its regulations do not come in conflict 
with the international obligations of its Member States, such as the ones established 
under the NATO framework. On this note, it cannot be forgotten that the NAT is 
founded upon implementing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.  
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The scope of the derogation set by Article 42 TEU 
Article 42 TEU mentions that the EU policy on common security and defence 
shall be compatible with the NATO security and defence policy, while respecting the 
obligations of its Member States under the latter.  
The scope of Article 42 TEU could be determined taking into account the 
principle of speciality of international organisations. The principle of speciality was 
developed as an international organisation does not possess a general competence 
as subject of international law.33 According to this principle, international organisations 
“are invested by the states which create them with powers, the limits of which are a 
function of the common interests whose promotion those states entrust to them.”34 
With regard to NATO, its main objective and its nature are provided for in the NAT, 
specifically in Article 5, as the organisation establishes a framework for the common 
                                                          
32 Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the 
Treaty of Lisbon, Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0335:0359:EN:PDF (emphasis 
added).   
33 ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, advisory opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, 
pp. 66, 78-9.  
34 Idem. 
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security and defence of its Member States under Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
The powers of the organisation are either expressly written in the constituent 
instrument or have arisen in time as implied powers, as considered necessary for the 
fulfilment of the particular functions of NATO. In the same vein, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) stated that under international law the organisation must be deemed 
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the charter, are 
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its 
duties.35  
As far as NATO is concerned, its path and prerogatives on the international 
scene have evolved in time and its Strategic Concept, document providing strategic 
direction for Alliance activities, was re-examined to ensure that it remained fully 
consistent with the new security situation and challenges of the organisation’s 
geographical sphere of interest. For example, under the 2010 Strategic Concept, the 
essential core tasks of NATO are collective defence, crisis management and 
cooperative security.36 
Despite the changing circumstances, the organisation keeps fulfilling its 
collective defence role within the limits set by the principle of speciality. Through the 
agreements concluded after the adoption of the NAT, the Member States started 
building on the legal foundation of the Washington Treaty, in order to ensure the 
necessary standards for the fulfilment of the organisation’s role. Consequently, the 
Member States, through agreements such as the NATO SOFA, the Paris Protocol or 
Supplementary Agreements, consented to further obligations towards the organisation 
(granting a specific status to the forces of another Member State or to the NATO 
IMHQs located within their territories). All the obligations consented by NATO members, 
regardless of any financial or economic implications they might have, are exclusively 
intended to allow the effective functioning and accomplishment of the organisation’s 
objective, maintain its autonomy and independence, and fall within the scope of the 
established common security and defence framework.  
Consequently, Article 42 TEU is to be regarded as an overarching umbrella in 
favour of the NATO legal regime when confronted with any potential inconsistency 
with newly adopted EU laws. As a matter of principle, NATO could only be subject to 
any legal requirement impeding upon its special status only if freely consented by the 
organisation, never driven by a third party. 
Concluding Remarks 
As shown above, NATO has a special regime granted by its Member States 
which derives from Article 8 of the NAT and follows the very international purpose of 
the organisation, providing an effective framework for the collective security and 
defence of its members. The importance of the fulfilment of NATO’s objectives is 
equally reflected in the founding treaties of the European Union and taken into 
consideration by the European bodies while adopting regulations and directives. 
                                                          
35 ICJ, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, advisory opinion, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 
182.  
36 Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010, Core Tasks 
and Principles, para. 4. 
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Article 42 TEU settled once and for all the issue of primacy with regard to the common 
security and defence policy established under NATO, whereas Article 351 TFEU 
represented a means of ensuring the EU Member States international obligations, inter 
alia towards NATO. 
Lastly, maybe one of the most persuasive arguments towards the compatibility 
of the NATO-EU regimes is that for more than fifty years, since the establishment of the 
European Communities, there has been no related litigation or any NATO-EU high level 
meeting to address incompatibilities. Therefore, it is the conclusion of the author that 
incompatibilities do not exist in NATO treaties nor in EU law and those that may be 
presented as such by EU law implementers37, clearly disregard solid legal grounds and 
unequivocal policy practices by both organisations.  
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37 Andrés Munoz Mosquera, Deputy SHAPE Legal Adviser at NATO/Supreme Allied Command Operations Legal 
Office, argues that neither the EU law, primary and secondary, nor the EU institutions have ever 
challenged the obligations of the EU nations, that are also members of NATO, with respect to the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the rest of the Organisation’s treaties; however, certain medium-level 
implementers, at national level, have shown a tendency to do it via preliminary questions to the CJEU. 
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EU-NATO Relations: Some General and Legal Considerations 
By Dr. Frederik Naert1 
Introduction 
In this contribution, I will describe the basic features of the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) (I) and how the CSDP relates to NATO (II).2 I will then make 
some observations on current legal challenges for the CSDP that might also be of 
interest to NATO (III).  
 
I. Basic Features of the CSDP 
Unlike NATO, the European Communities were not established as security 
organisations, even though their establishment did serve, at least in part, security 
objectives. However, especially since the creation of the European Union in the early 
1990s, the European Union3 has gradually acquired significant competences in the 
security field.  
These competences include the CSDP, but also many other competences that 
are relevant to security issues new and old. For example, the EU has competences on 
internal security, counter-terrorism, sanctions (“restrictive measures”), space, cyber, 
arms trade, etc.  
The CSDP is governed by Articles 42 to 46 of the EU Treaty.4 Its main features can 
be summarised as follows: 
First, the CSDP is part of the EU’s broader Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP)5 and is consequently subject to the specific rules governing this area of EU 
activity. This includes decision-making by the Council by unanimity6 and a very limited 
role of the European Commission, Parliament and the Court of Justice. 
Second, as part of the EU’s external relations, the CSDP shall respect 
international law and the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the primary role of the 
UN Security Council.7 This has been specifically confirmed with regard to the CSDP.8 
Third, the core of the CSDP consists of “an operational capacity drawing on 
civilian and military assets” which the EU may use on “missions outside the Union for 
                                                          
1 Member of the Legal Service of the Council of the EU, affiliated senior researcher at the KU Leuven and Director 
of the Military Law & the Law of War Review. The views expressed are solely my own and do not bind the Council 
or its Legal Service. 
2 See more extensively my chapter on ‘EU Crisis Management Operations and Their Relations with NATO 
Operations’, in the NATO Legal Deskbook 2010 (2nd ed.), pp. 281-300. 
3 Initially alongside the European Communities but the latter have now been incorporated into the European 
Union, with the exception of Euratom, which still exists as a separate legal person. 
4 The post-Lisbon consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union are published in the Official Journal (O.J.) C 326, 26 October 2012 (see also http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#current). 
5 See Article 42(1) EU Treaty. The provisions on the CSDP are included in the EU Treaty Title on the CFSP. 
6 This is subject to a few exceptions, in particular for decisions on the ‘Start-Up Fund’ for financing operations not 
financed by the EU budget, on the European Defence Agency and on ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (see 
Articles 41(3), 44(2) and 46(2) EU Treaty). 
7 See Articles 3(5); 21(1) and 21(2) c EU Treaty and Declaration (No. 13) concerning the CFSP. 
8 See Article 42(1) EU Treaty. 
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peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”.9 These 
missions are further defined in Article 43 of the EU Treaty: they “shall include joint 
disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” and 
may all “contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third 
countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” This covers a wide range of military 
and civilian crisis management operations, including high intensity peace 
enforcement (“tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” 
– this is sometimes overlooked).  
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Fourth, the EU Member States have a mutual assistance obligation, as 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
provides that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all 
the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter.” However, it continues that this “shall not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” This qualification is notably 
meant to exempt the neutral/non aligned Member States such as Ireland from any 
obligations which would be incompatible with that status.10 Furthermore, pursuant to 
Article 42(2) of the EU Treaty, the CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of a 
                                                          
9 See Article 42(1) EU Treaty. 
10 See the Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States meeting within the 
European Council on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon, adopted on 18-19 June 2009 (as 
well as the earlier Irish and EU declarations made at the Seville European Council of 21-22 June 2002). This 2009 
decision is now reflected in the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon, O.J. L 60, 2 
March 2013, p. 131. Article 3 of that protocol inter alia provides that “The Treaty of Lisbon does not affect or 
prejudice Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality”; that “It will be for Member States - including Ireland, 
acting in a spirit of solidarity and without prejudice to its traditional policy of military neutrality - to determine the 
nature of aid or assistance to be provided to a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim 
of armed aggression on its territory” and that “The Treaty of Lisbon does not provide for the creation of a 
European army or for conscription to any military formation”. For a more extensive analysis, see F. Naert, 
International Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed 
Conflict and Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010), pp. 213-233 (the thesis on which this book is based, is 
available online at https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/1979/1986/1/Doctoraatsthesis_Frederik_Naert_08-09-
2008_final.pdf). 
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common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the 
European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to 
the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements.” This decision has not yet been taken.11 
Fifth, both the CSDP generally and the mutual assistance clause in particular are 
without prejudice to NATO and the obligations of NATO Member States (see infra, II.1). 
The EU may conduct CSDP operations either autonomously or with recourse to NATO 
assets and capabilities.12  
Sixth, Denmark decided to not participate in the elaboration and the 
implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications.13 Thus, in practice Denmark does not (and cannot) participate in the EU’s 
operation Atalanta even though it was active in counter-piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. However, it does participate in EU civilian crisis management. 
 
II. The Relationship between the CSDP and NATO 
The founding decisions of the CSDP inter alia set out a number of premises for EU 
– NATO relations, on the basis of which these relations have been developed. 
1. The Development of the CSDP Is without Prejudice to NATO 
First and foremost, the development of the CSDP always was and continues to 
be without prejudice to NATO. The requirement to respect the obligations of certain 
Member States towards NATO, in relation to the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy under the CSDP has consistently been stated in the EU Treaty 
and is now enshrined in its Article 42(2).14 
Moreover, Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty adds that commitments and 
cooperation relating to Member States’ obligations of aid and assistance towards 
another Member State that is the victim of armed aggression on its territory shall be 
consistent with commitments under NATO, “which, for those States which are members 
of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation”.  
Interestingly enough, none of the provisions on the CSDP in the EU Treaty specify 
in any way how Article 42(7) should be implemented. For instance, Article 38 of the EU 
Treaty on the role of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) refers to crisis 
management operations under Article 43 of the EU Treaty and not to Article 42(7). This 
absence of implementing arrangements is a marked difference with the “solidarity 
clause” laid down in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).15 This could probably also be explained by the fact that the obligation under 
                                                          
11 See the 2009 Decision and the Protocol supra previous note. 
12 See § 1 of the Cologne Declaration of the European Council and Presidency report on strengthening the 
European common policy on security and defence (3-4 June 1999, Presidency conclusions, Annex III) and § 4 of 
the Presidency report annexed thereto. See further infra, II.4-6. 
13 See Article 5 of Protocol (No. 22) on the Position of Denmark. 
14 Article 42(2) of the EU Treaty provides that the CSDP’s “progressive framing of a common Union defence policy 
[that] will lead to a common defence … shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their 
common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and 
be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework”. 
15 Pursuant to the first paragraph of this provision, “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of 
solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. The 
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Article 42(7) rests on the Member States and not the Union (again in contrast to the 
solidarity clause, which addresses both).  
In practice, as most EU Member States are also NATO members, Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty would in any event come into play when one of them is 
attacked. However, this raises two practical questions, which have not been 
thoroughly addressed so far. The first question is how non-NATO EU Member States 
would provide their assistance (at least those not invoking their neutrality – e.g. see 
above the case of Ireland) in this scenario. The second question is how this assistance 
would be coordinated or organized if the Member State attacked is not a NATO 
member. Presumably, ad hoc arrangements would have to be agreed on to cover 
either case.16 
 
www.nato.int 
2. The Overall Framework for EU-NATO Consultation and Cooperation 
The framework for overall EU-NATO relations17 is based on the 16 December 2002 
EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP setting out the principles governing their mutual 
relations,18 the EU-NATO Security Agreement of 14 March 200319 and the “Berlin Plus 
arrangements” on EU access to NATO assets (see infra, II.5).20  
It includes permanent EU-NATO consultations and cooperation, including 
regular joint meetings of the NAC and the PSC/Council of the EU. However, due to 
political difficulties between Cyprus and Turkey, discussions at formal meetings have 
been limited to Berlin plus issues.  
In addition, efforts to enhance Member States’ capabilities in both organisations 
should be complementary,21 including through the EU-NATO Capability Group22 and 
staff-to-staff contacts between the EDA and HQ SACT. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
remainder of this article contains further rules on the (adoption of the) arrangements for implementing this clause. 
A draft decision on its implementation by the Union is under discussion in the Council.  
16 See F. Naert, supra note 10, pp. 230-233. 
17 Article 21(1) of the EU Treaty requires that in its external relations the EU develop relations and build partnerships 
with like minded States and organisations. 
18 See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm. 
19 O.J. L 80, 27 March 2003, p. 35/36, entered into force 14 March 2003. 
20See ‘EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus’, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf. 
21 See the 16 December 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, supra note 18. 
22 See, e.g. EU Council Doc. 6805/03 (26 February 2003), pp. 4, 13 and 15-17. Unless indicated otherwise, Council 
documents cited by number are (unclassified and) available in the online public register of Council documents 
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Finally, in practice, broader EU-NATO relations have also developed as various 
EU policies have become relevant to NATO. 
3. The EU Would Only Act under the CSDP Where NATO as a Whole Was Not 
Engaged  
The premise that the EU should only conduct operations where NATO as a whole 
is not engaged23 has evolved significantly over time. There are many cases where 
both organisations have or had operations in the same theatre, but where their 
operations were quite distinct. For instance, see the (recently terminated) EU Police 
Mission in Bosnia24 alongside NATO’s military SFOR operation; the EU’s civilian rule of 
law mission EULEX Kosovo25 alongside NATO’s KFOR and the EU’s Police Mission in 
Afghanistan26 alongside NATO’s ISAF. However, in other cases, the operations 
were/are more similar. For instance, see the EU27 and NATO support for AMIS II and, 
more recently, the EU and NATO counter piracy operations off the coast of Somalia 
(Atalanta28 and Ocean Shield).  
4. There Should Be No Unnecessary Duplication29 
One of the most challenging questions in EU-NATO relations is to what extent 
there should be some duplication in the EU of certain military structures which exist in 
NATO. 
The ability of the EU to conduct operations without recourse to NATO assets (see 
infra, II.6) inevitably requires some EU military structures. However, the extent to which 
the EU should have military structures has been, and continues to be, the subject of 
considerable debate. In this respect, the EU has a Military Committee, a small Military 
Staff and a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability,30 but it has no standing military 
command structure and headquarters. Therefore, the chain of command for an 
operation, in particular the designation of its headquarters, is determined on an ad 
hoc basis for each operation.31 Headquarters could initially be made available by 
NATO (see infra, II.5) or by Member States. Nevertheless, as the CSDP has evolved, 
there has been a somewhat greater acceptance for the nucleus of a proper 
headquarters within the EU in defined circumstances. In particular, following a 
compromise in late 2003, a (civilian/military planning) cell at the EU Military Staff, an EU 
cell at SHAPE, and NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS (which would become 
the NATO Permanent Liaison Team), were put in place.32 On this basis, the mandate of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/access-to-council-documents-public-register.aspx?lang=EN. 
23 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, § 27. 
24 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/. 
25 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/index_en.htm. 
26 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/index_en.htm. 
27 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-support-amis-darfur/. 
28 See http://eunavfor.eu/. 
29 See § 3 in fine of the 1999 Cologne Presidency Report and Helsinki European Council Presidency 
Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, § 27. 
30 The CPCC acts as the equivalent of an operational headquarters for most of the EU’s civilian CSDP 
missions.  
31 On the command and control (C2) arrangements in military CSDP operations, see the EU Concept 
for Military Command and Control, EU Council Doc. 10688/08 REV 3 of 13 September 2012 
(declassified). See also the EU Concept for Force Generation, Council Doc. 10690 of 16 June 2008. 
32 Presidency Conclusions, 12-13 December 2003, § 90. See also EU Council Document 10596/04 REV 1 
of 1 April 2009 (‘European defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations’; declassified). 
NATO LEGAL GAZETTE PAGE 29 
 
the EUMS33 was amended to give it the responsibility “of generating the capacity to 
plan and run an autonomous EU military operation, and maintains the capacity within 
EUMS rapidly to set up an operations centre for a specific operation, in particular 
where a joint civil/military response is required and where no national HQ is identified, 
once a decision on such an operation has been taken by the Council, upon the 
advice of the EUMC”.34 The EU Operations Centre reached operational capability on 1 
January 2007 and has been activated for exercises. In addition, the role of the EUMS in 
the early stages of planning for a military CSDP operation has been enhanced.35 The 
Council may now also decide to activate the EU Operations Centre to serve as 
Operation Headquarters. The EU Operations Centre was activated for the first time in 
relation to an operation in 2012,36 albeit not in a command role.37  
5. The EU May Conduct Military Operations with Recourse to NATO Assets 
Turning to more operational cooperation, the EU may conduct some of its military 
operations with recourse to NATO assets.38  
The arrangements for the EU to conduct operations with access to NATO assets 
were agreed upon in March 2003. They were applied in Operation Concordia 
(FYROM) and are still applied in Operation Althea (Bosnia), and they function well. The 
package on these arrangements is called the “Berlin Plus” agreement/arrangement 
and governs EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and EU 
use of NATO assets and capabilities.39  
These operations take place when both the EU and NATO agree that a given EU 
operation will be conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Once that 
is decided, the Berlin plus arrangements provide the general framework, which must 
be supplemented by an operation-specific arrangement on the modalities of putting 
NATO assets and capabilities at the disposal of the EU for its operation. In such 
operations, operational planning may be carried out by the Alliance’s planning 
bodies, and the EU Operational Headquarters will be located at SHAPE. DSACEUR is 
then the preferred option for designation as Operation Commander. However, the 
entire chain of command of an EU Force remains under the political control and 
strategic direction of the EU throughout the EU military operation, after consultation 
between the EU and NATO. Within this framework, the EU Operation Commander 
                                                          
33 See also the December 2003 European Council approved document on NATO-EU Consultation, 
Planning and Operations, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78414%20-%20EU-
NATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf. 
34 See Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the 
establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, O.J. L 132, 26 May 2005, p. 17. On the Civ-Mil 
Cell and the EU Operations Centre, see also EU Council Doc. 13990/04 EXT 1 of 28 January 2005 
(‘European Defence NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations’). 
35 The Civil/Military Cell’s functions were later partially redistributed within the EUMS and partially 
transferred to the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate but the capacity to generate the EU 
Operations Centre remains within the EUMS (see also Council Decision 2008/298/CFSP of 7 April 2008, 
O.J. L 102, 12 April 2008, p. 25). 
36 See Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP of 23 March 2012 on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa, O.J. L 89, 27 March 2012, p. 
66. 
37 See id., Article 1(2). See also http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-
centre/index_en.htm. 
38 See supra note 12. 
39 The agreement itself (an exchange of letters with a long list of annexes) is not in the public domain. Its content 
is summarized in ‘EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus’, supra note 20. 
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reports on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only, and NATO is informed of 
developments in the situation by the appropriate EU bodies (namely the PSC40 and 
the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC)).41 Furthermore, such operations 
are conducted in accordance with EU rules, concepts, etc.  
The non-EU European NATO members will participate in such an operation if they 
so wish, upon a decision by the Council to launch the operation. On the EU side, 
Cyprus, an EU but non NATO member, cannot participate in these operations.42 
6. The EU May Conduct Autonomous EU Military Operations 
From its early stages on, it has been clearly stated that the EU should also be able 
to act on its own, i.e. without recourse to NATO assets.43  
The relations of such operations with NATO and/or NATO operations are 
determined on a case-by-case basis and are not subject to standing arrangements 
except for information and consultation. The political obstacle to greater EU-NATO 
coordination (see supra, II.2) has limited cooperation at the “Brussels” level and has, 
for example, prevented the adoption of EU-NATO cooperation agreements regarding 
their operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Instead, a number of mechanisms have 
been developed in the field with a view to appropriate coordination and/or 
cooperation. For instance, EUPOL Afghanistan and ISAF cooperate at the provincial 
level, with EUPOL personnel being assisted by ISAF’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams.44 
Similarly, KFOR and EULEX Kosovo have developed a good level of working relations. 
As another example, Atalanta and Ocean Shield de-conflict and coordinate at the 
working level through SHADE (Shared Awareness and De-confliction) meetings, and 
also with other navies/operations in theatre.  
7. The Non-EU (European) NATO Members 
The non-EU European NATO members (currently Turkey, Iceland and Norway) 
should be able to participate in CSDP operations to the fullest extent possible but 
without affecting the EU’s decision-making autonomy.45 The agreement reached on 
this includes arrangements on the involvement of these third States in the CSDP, in 
particular on consultation and participation in operations.46 Consequently, these NATO 
countries have participated in several CSDP operations and have concluded a 
                                                          
40 Pursuant to Article 38 EU Treaty, the PSC, which meets at ambassadorial level, “shall exercise, under the 
responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the 
[CSDP] crisis management operations” and the Council may authorise it to take decisions in this respect. 
41 See e.g. Article 13(2) Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, O.J. L 252, 28 July 2004, p. 10: “The entire chain of command of the EU 
Force shall remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the EU military 
operation, after consultation between the EU and NATO. Within this framework, the EU Operation Commander 
shall report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only. NATO shall be informed of developments in the 
situation by the appropriate bodies, in particular the PSC and CEUMC”. 
42 Because Cyprus has no security agreement with NATO and is not involved in NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
programme. 
43 See supra note 12. See supra, II.4 on the command arrangements for such operations. 
44 See e.g. Article 4(2) of the EUPOL Afghanistan Council Decision (2010/279/CFSP of 18 May 2010, O.J. L 123 of 19 
May 2010, p. 4, as amended): “Technical arrangements shall be concluded with ISAF and Regional Command/ 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Lead Nations for information exchange, medical, security and logistical 
support including accommodation by Regional Commands and PRTs”. 
45 See § 1 of the Cologne European Council Declaration on strengthening the European common policy on 
security and defence and § 5 of the annexed Presidency Report. 
46 See the conclusions of the European Council meetings in Nice in December 2000 and in Brussels in October 
2002. 
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permanent agreement on their participation in such operations.47  
The same is true for Canada, for which separate arrangements have been 
adopted,48 and which has also concluded a framework participation agreement with 
the EU.49 Cooperation has also gradually developed in practice with the US. For 
instance, the US participates in some civilian CSDP missions and has concluded a 
framework participation agreement with the EU in 2011.50 
 
III. Some Observations on Current Legal Challenges for the CSDP  
The EU’s security and defence policy faces a number of challenges. I would like to 
identify those which are of a legal nature and may be of interest to the NATO legal 
community.  
Firstly, the EU increasingly employs all its instruments in a coordinated manner as 
part of a “comprehensive approach” on the basis of horizontal external relations 
objectives and direction by the European Council.51 To achieve this, the EU has 
multiple tools, including in the field of external security (e.g. CSDP missions), external 
dimensions of the area of freedom, security and justice, diplomacy, development and 
technical, financial or economic assistance/cooperation,52 trade policy (dual use 
goods and arms trade), etc. However, each of these instruments is subject to distinct 
decision-making procedures, and thus it is a challenge to ensure coherence in 
decision-making and in implementing a truly comprehensive approach.53  
Secondly, an important external challenge for the EU is the relationship between 
EU law and international law. The increasing body of EU legislation and the autonomy 
of the EU legal order, as affirmed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has, in some 
cases, given rise to discussion on the compatibility of certain rules of EU law or EU 
decisions with international law.54 This is in addition to questions about the relationship 
between different areas of international law, such as human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, and between human rights law and UN Security 
Council resolutions. 
Thirdly, and linked to this, the EU, like NATO, is facing increasing scrutiny and must 
                                                          
47 See respectively O.J. L 189, 12 July 2006, p. 16/17 ( entered into force on 1 August 2007); O.J. L 67, 14 March 
2005, p.1/2 (entered into force on 1 April 2005 and provisionally applied as of the date of signature) and O.J. L 67, 
14 March 2005, p. 1/8 (entered into force on 1 January 2005). Such agreements generally determine the key 
modalities for cases in which the third country concerned participates in an EU operation. 
48 See EU Council Doc. 8721/02 of 6 May 2002. 
49 24 November 2005, O.J. L 315, 1 December 2005, p. 20/21 (entered into force 1 December 2005). 
50 17 May 2011, OJ L 143, 31 May 2011, p. 2 (entered into force on 1 June 2011). 
51 See Articles 21-22 EU Treaty. A good example of this approach is the EU’s strategic framework for the Horn of 
Africa: see the Council Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa adopted on 14 November 2011 
(http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/st16858.en11_en.pdf). 
52 Some financial instruments cover areas closely linked to foreign and security policy: see especially the 
Instrument for Stability (see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_en.htm), which has for instance complemented 
Atalanta’s counter piracy actions, and the African Peace Facility (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm), which inter alia 
provides funding for AMISOM.  
53 EU legal advisers often deal a lot with internal legal issues, including litigation before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). 
54 See especially Joined Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, 3 
September 2008; the EU General Court’s subsequent judgment of 30 September 2010 in Case T-85/09, Yassin and 
the latest appeals judgment of 18 July 2013 in Cases C-595/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-584/10 P. This case has had a 
clear impact on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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address accountability and transparency issues in the field of its CSDP. Regarding 
accountability, there are questions over the attribution of actions of an EU operation 
to the EU and/or Member States for the purposes of international responsibility. The 
absence of ECJ jurisdiction in that regard55 has led to a specific and complex system 
of remedies.56 There is no consensus on some aspects of attribution and jurisdiction, 
but the subject is likely to be clarified to some extent in the course of the EU’s 
forthcoming accession to the ECHR.57 A draft accession agreement and 
accompanying explanatory report were agreed in April 2013,58 and the ECJ has been 
asked to give its opinion on whether that draft agreement is compatible with the EU 
Treaties.59  
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55 There are exceptions to this as regards restrictive measures against individuals (sanctions) and the delimitation 
between the CFSP and other EU policies. For an example of the latter, see Case C-658/11 (pertaining to 
Atalanta). 
56 For an extensive discussion, see F. Naert, ‘The International Responsibility of the Union in the Context of Its CSDP 
Operations’ in P. Koutrakos & M. Evans (eds.), The International Responsibility of the European Union (Hart, 2013), 
pp. 313-338 and ‘Shared Responsibility in the Framework of the EU’s CSDP Operations’, chapter forthcoming in a 
volume that will be published in the framework of the research project on Shared Responsibility in International 
Law (SHARES) of the Amsterdam Center of International Law (see http://www.sharesproject.nl/). 
57 Article 6(2) EU Treaty provides that the EU shall accede to the ECHR. See also Protocol No 5 to the Treaty of 
Lisbon and Article 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR (Strasbourg, 13 May 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194, entered into force 
on 1 June 2010), which amended article 59 ECHR to this effect. 
58 Both are contained in the report in Council of Europe Doc. 47+1(2013)008rev2 of 10 June 2013, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. See 
especially Articles 1(3)-(4) and 3 of the draft accession agreement as well as paragraphs 23-25 of the draft 
explanatory report. 
59 The case number is A-2/13. 
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A Matter of Practice under International Institutional Law: NATO 
International Military Headquarters and Exemption from 
Residency and Visa in EU Legal Order 
 
Mette Prassé Hartov1 
Andres B. Munoz Mosquera2 
 
Introduction 
In the course of developing Supplementary Agreements to the Paris Protocol3, the 
authors have seen the need to analyse the regime compatibility of European Union 
(EU) legislation with provisions of the Supplementary Agreement and eventually with 
the NATO founding treaties in an attempt to empirically explain the need for 
cooperation and coordination4 between and among international organisations as a 
practical measure and a principle in international law. This principle is expressly 
adopted by the EU. Article 3, paragraph 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states 
that “[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote […] the 
strict observance and the development of international law.” The TEU more specifically 
promotes effective multilateralism in Article 21, paragraph 1, which provides that 
“[t]he Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, 
and international, regional or global organisations […]” and that it “shall promote 
multilateral solutions to common problems.”5  
 
Likewise, EU Member States’ participation in international organisations is also 
important. Declaration 14, attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, explicitly recognises this 
importance in the area of foreign policy.6 The Declaration states that ”the provisions 
covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy […] will not affect the existing legal 
basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation 
and conduct of its […] participation in international organisations.  
 
This article specifically reviews the area of visa waiver and exemption from 
immigration regulations enjoyed by international organisations in their hosting State.7 
The authors conclude that, consistent with their nationally or internationally appointed 
                                                          
1 Deputy Legal Adviser at NATO Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Office of the Legal 
Advisor.   
2 Deputy SHAPE Legal Adviser at NATO/Supreme Allied Command Operations Legal Office. He is a graduate of the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 
3 Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, dated 28 
August 1952 (Paris Protocol). Supplementary Agreements are those bilateral treaties concluded pursuant to the 
Paris Protocol, Article 16, between the Supreme Headquarters and a State hosting an international military 
headquarters or an international military organisation granted status in accordance with the Paris Protocol, Article 
14.  
4 See ‘The need of Coordination’ in H. G. Schermers, Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2011), 
para.1702. 
5 For further analysis on effective multilateralism see Wouters, Bijlmakers and Meuwissen ‘The EU as a Multilateral 
Security Actor after Lisbon: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects’, February 2012, p.6.  
6 Declaration 14 to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference Which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon. 
7 A more comprehensive article elaborating on this topic and covering more areas, such as exemption from value-
added tax and duty, self-insurance of vehicles and recognition of drivers’ license, is intended to be published 
shortly by the authors.  
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international mission, neither members of an international military headquarters nor 
members of a sending State visiting force are taking up residence in a hosting State. 
Moreover, EU Member States retain the discretion to identify certain categories of 
persons (particularly diplomats and staff members of international organisations) as a 
special category enjoying status with equivalent value to that of holding a residence 
permit. These categories may equally be identified as such under the Schengen 
Border Code and thus be entitled to enter and depart from the Schengen area. The 
discretion to identify those categories permits NATO nations, who are also members of 
the EU, to honor the obligations established under NATO treaties. Therefore, the EC 
Regulation No. 539/2001(OJ L 81, 21.3.2001) for EU States members of NATO is not the 
nisi legem (the only law) when considering the topic of residency and visas. 
Consequently, the language in the Supplementary Agreements and the EC 
Regulation No. 539, or later amendments, is compatible and complementary. 
 
Finally, the authors have not been able to identify the legal effect of status “with 
equivalent value of a residence permit” in EU Law, as it does not appear to be 
specifically defined. Rather, the term is used to categorise residence permits other 
than those “[r]esidence permits issued according to the uniform format” and covers 
“all other documents issued to third-country nationals authorising a stay in, or re-entry 
into, the territory of [the Member State] with the exception of temporary permits issued 
pending examination of a first application for a residence permit or an application for 
asylum.”8 Based on the context of which it appears in the Journal, this status can only 
be understood as having a temporary duration nature as it is entirely linked to a 
professional and fully international function.  
 
 
www.nato.int 
General Observations Regarding International Organisations and Privileges and 
Immunities 
The privileges and immunities of international organisations regarding minimum 
protection of their assets, headquarters, international staff, and member 
representatives are normally recorded in the constituent treaty by which the 
organisation was established. Constituent treaties usually define the mission of the 
                                                          
8 Official Journal of the European Union, 8.7.2011 C 201/01, cover page. A ‘consolidated version’ of those 
notifications is found on the EU Directorate-General for Home Affairs’ webpage, providing the specimen of cards 
issued by Foreign Ministries of the Member States, under an annex: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/docs/handbook-annex_22_en.pdf. 
NATO LEGAL GAZETTE PAGE 35 
 
organisation9 and apply to all state parties to it. The facilities (status) accorded to 
international organisations are operative (support the mission and objective of the 
organisation) and cover generally what the participating states consider necessary to 
enable the organisation to function effectively and to carry out its mission on behalf of 
its constituents. Functional immunities and privileges are recognised as a prerequisite 
for the effective operation of international organisations in international law. However, 
whether they constitute customary10 international law remains a subject of debate. 
The most prominent treaty examples are the Convention on Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations11 and the subsequent Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialised Agencies.12 Although it may be argued that the United 
Nations Conventions provide a post-Second World War paradigm,13 nations have 
continued to explicitly address privileges and immunities in founding documents and in 
headquarters or seat agreements. The United Nations conducted a study in 1967 (and 
in 1985) on the topic, as it relates to the United Nations and the specialised agencies,14 
in an attempt to record customary international law in respect of the status of member 
representatives to international organisations. Following this study, the Vienna 
Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International 
Organisations of a Universal Character was introduced in 1975. The Convention has 
not been signed by a sufficient number of States and has thus not entered into force, 
and several States questioned whether the Convention in fact reflected customary 
international law.15 However, based on the discussions referenced here and 
accepting that customary law is often vague, we can safely assume that certain 
immunities have become commonly recognised as customary norms.16 Regardless, 
                                                          
9 For draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organisations or between international 
organisations with commentaries, see International Law Commission 34th Session, 1982, Yearbook of the 
International Law 
Commission, 1982, vol. II, Part Two. 
10 ‘[‘La] [c]onvention générale sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies approuvée par l’Assemblée 
générale le 13 février 1946, pour répondre aux exigences de l’article 105 de la Charte … [la] convention sur les 
privilèges et immunités des institutions spécialisées. Cette convention, de façon, inhabituelle, fut d’abord para 
l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU (21 novembre 1947) … ces deux conventions aient été á l’origine d’une pratique 
génératrice d’une sorte de droit commun (coutumier) des privilèges et immunités … il s’agit en effet, dans un cas 
comme dans l’autre, d’assurer aa leurs bénéficiaires l’indépendance nécessaire á l’exercice de leurs fonctions.’ 
P.M. Dupuy, Droit International Public (2012), pp. 225-226. 
11 Adopted 13 February 1946 by the United Nations General Assembly; entered into force 17 September 1946; UNTS 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%201/v1.pdf 
12 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 November 1947; entered into force on 02 
December 1948, UNTS http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20817/volume-817-a-521-english.pdf 
13 See August Reinisch in Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies (Article, 2009, published on www.un.org/law/avl). 
14 For further reading on the the practice of the United Nations see what described by Gerster/Rotenberg in the 
comments to Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations in ’The Charter of the United Nations – a 
Commentary’, Bruno Simma, et al. (ed.), (second edition, 2002). 
15 For a more detailed discussion, see Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie, (fifth edition, 1998), p. 684. 
16 See 38th session of the ILC (1986), in which the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Leonardo Díaz-González (Third Report) 
provided an outline of the scope of the privileges and immunities to be granted to both the organisation and its 
officials. The ILC never completed its draft Articles on this topic, the outline captures the scope of the functional 
necessity and the associated requirements to effectively enable international organisations and of their 
international staff to perform their mission. Or, as summarised in the Third Report of the ILC Special Rapporteur, the 
granting of these privileges and immunities is ‘founded on the principle underlying the legal status of those 
organisations, i.e. the guarantee afforded by the host country that they can, with complete freedom and 
independence, exercise on its territory their constitutional and statutory activities or any other activity connected 
with the functions assigned to them’. Paragraph 31 of the Third Report outlines the entitlements as follows:  
I. Privileges and immunities of the organisation 
A. Non-fiscal privileges and immunities:[…] 
B. Financial and fiscal privileges:[…] 
 II. Privileges and immunities of officials 
A. Non-fiscal: 
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the requirement (and expectation on nations) to provide functional protection to 
international organisations is generally recognised in customary international law: 
“members – and a fortiori the headquarters State – may not at one and the same time 
establish an organisation and fail to provide it with those immunities that ensure its role 
as distinct from that of the host State (and other member States).”17  
Consistent with the notion of function, international organisations across the 
spectrum enjoy different levels of immunity from legal process, measures of execution, 
financial controls, taxes and duties as well as inviolability of documents and archives.18 
The extent of these customary norms has been examined by the International Law 
Commission (ILC), which confirms the general principles. In his Third Report, the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Leonardo Díaz-González, provided an outline of the scope of the 
privileges and immunities to be granted to both the organisation and its officials.19 
While the ILC never completed its draft Articles on this topic, the outline still confirms 
the scope of functional necessity20 and the associated requirements necessary to 
effectively enable international organisations and their international staff to perform 
their mission. It is important to understand that the principle is different from that of 
diplomatic immunity: the principle of functional necessity states that an international 
organisation shall be granted privileges and immunities which are necessary for the 
effective exercise of their functions. 21 As summarised in the Third Report of the ILC 
Special Rapporteur, the granting of these privileges and immunities is “founded on the 
principle underlying the legal status of those organisations, i.e. the guarantee afforded 
by the host country that they can, with complete freedom and independence, 
exercise on its territory their constitutional and statutory activities or any other activity 
connected with the functions assigned to them”.22 Although the ILC reports did not 
materialise in a treaty, the general principle is widely recognised in international law, 
and it is affirmed in the UN Charter (Article 105, paragraphs 1 and 2). 23  
 
Regardless of the existence of the well-established general principles, States have 
continued to embed privileges and immunities in the treaties by which international 
organisations are established and / or in a subsequent headquarters or status 
agreement. This is perhaps to acknowledge that short of specific agreement, the 
recognition of further entitlements is logically prone to debate unless national 
legislation foresees such circumstances and provides status to international 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(a) immunity in respect of official acts; 
(b) immunity from national service obligations; 
(c) immunity from immigration restrictions and registration of aliens; 
(d) diplomatic privileges and immunities of executives and other senior officials; 
(e) repatriation facilities in times of international crisis; 
B. Financial and fiscal: 
(a) exemption from taxation of salaries and emoluments; 
(b) exemption from customs duties. 
III. Privileges and immunities of experts on mission for, and of persons having official business with, the 
organisation.[…] 
17 Reuter as quoted in Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, C.F. Amerasinghe (1996), ibid, 
p. 401. 
18 See discussion in C.F. Amerasinghe, pp. 397-402. 
19 Third Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez (38th session of the ILC (1986)).paragraph 31.  
20 See also Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
21 Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 6th ed., 2008.1319.  
22 Third Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez (38th session of the ILC (1986)).paragraph 30. 
23 Shaw p.1319. See also the work of ILC.  Already in its 1977 Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. 
Abdullah El-Erian (29th session of the ILC (1977)), the ILC noted that both the literature and state practice 
recognised the functionality principle as customary law.  
NATO LEGAL GAZETTE PAGE 37 
 
organisations and their staff. Since the privileges and immunities are entirely 
purposeful, the status should be aligned with the specific foundational or constituent 
treaty(ies) of the international organisation. Moreover, the detailed status to be 
enjoyed in the host State is usually substantiated in further agreements between the 
organisation and its host State(s) rather than doing so ad hoc. As such, headquarters 
or basing agreements reflect the capacity (mandate, internal and international legal 
personalities) and captures the immunities and privileges required by a specific 
international organisation to effectively deliver its mission; privileges and immunities are 
assigned accordingly to enable the organisation to carry out its tasks and functions. 
This approach, therefore, does not necessarily reflect an opinio juris of States on 
customary international law in this field. It does, however, illustrate the development of 
public international law, and it speaks to 60 years of well-accepted State practice to 
describe the functions of international organisations in their constituent treaties and 
identify the corresponding privileges and immunities from the outset, rather than rely 
on more general principles in public international law.  
 
International Organisations and Employment of Staff 
Depending on its internal regulations, an international organisation typically 
recruits its international staff members amongst nationals of the member States. 
Following its internal rules, the organisation can employ personnel to serve in 
international functions (posts), and the host State is expected to facilitate this 
employment process and to not impose unreasonable and unnecessary obstacles, 
such as requiring that personnel obtain regular residency status in the host State or 
comply with general immigration regulations.24 This status is not granted for the 
personal benefit25 of the staff members: it is granted only “for the purpose of exercising 
their function in relation to the international organisation.”26 This functional approach is 
commonly captured in international agreements. The 1946 Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations exempts United Nations officials from 
the national regulatory framework regarding immigration and residence.27 A more 
recent example is that of the ICC Headquarters Agreement.28  
 
Due to the international nature of the staff, staff members may be a citizen of the 
hosting State or be recruited from abroad.29 The staff member may choose, subject to 
                                                          
24 See summary of ILC Third Report (1986), listing immunity from immigration restrictions and registration of aliens as 
one of the customary privileges granted in support of staff members. 
25 ‘Privileges and immunities should only be granted to meet the functional needs of international organisations.(…) 
Nor should States give undue weight to the idea of uniform treatment. Each organisation should be considered on 
its own merits.’ Council of Europe, 49th meeting of the European committee on legal cooperation (CDECJ), Final 
Activity Report, Committee of experts on public international law (CJ-DI), Strasbourg, 02-06 May 1988, p.8.  
26 Amerasinghe, p.390. 
27 Article V on Officials of the UN, Section 18: ‘[‘o]fficials of the United Nations shall […] (d) be immune, together with 
their spouses and relatives dependent on them, from immigration restrictions and alien registration’.  
28 The main privileges and immunities are set out in the Rome Statute (1998) which also identifies that a 
Headquarters Agreement shall be concluded between the International Criminal Court and The Netherlands. The 
Headquarters Agreement (ICC-BD/04-01-08) entered into force on 1 March 2008. Available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/99A82721-ED93-4088-B84D-7B8ADA4DD062/280775/ICCBD040108ENG1.pdf. Article 37, 
paragraph 1 of the Agreement provides Court officials, State representatives and counsel and persons assisting 
counsel with the right to ‘unimpeded entry into, exit from and movement within the host State’. Furthermore, 
paragraph two states that visas are not necessarily required, but if so they are to be ‘granted free of charge and as 
promptly as possible’. These visa privileges are extended to ‘members of the family forming part of the household’ 
in paragraph 3. 
29 Even in such a case, the function that is being performed in the international organisation determines when the 
staff member (including military personnel of the Host State) enjoys status, even if in defined or limited areas, not 
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the host nation’s laws, to become a permanent resident of the hosting State, but that 
is not a requirement to work for an international organisation.  
 
www.nato.int 
Visa Waiver and Council Regulation (EC) No 539/200130  
Upon entering and leaving a receiving State, NATO SOFA, Article III exempts the 
members of the visiting force (but not civilians or dependents) from passport, visa, and 
immigration control31 on the condition that they conform with the specifics detailed in 
the NATO SOFA and can present a valid travel order and their national (military) ID to 
the relevant authorities in the receiving State. This is a practical measure to ease the 
crossing of borders without a visa and passport and to enable visa-free transit and stay 
in a receiving State. It does not constitute a right for an individual to enter or stay in a 
country, and some countries require notification in advance of entry, just as the 
receiving State may require that it countersigns the travel order and request that the 
sending State remove an individual from its territory. Since NATO SOFA, Article III, 
paragraph 1 is limited to military personnel, members of an International Military 
Headquarters’ civilian component and all dependents must have a valid passport 
and, where applicable, a visa to facilitate the entry into and exit from receiving States. 
The entry into a State hosting an International Military Headquarters and any 
associated visa waiver or separate visa regime is usually addressed in a 
Supplementary Agreement. 
 
Article 4 of the Paris Protocol covers the basic rights and obligations of the 
International Military Headquarters and its personnel, providing that, in general, these 
can be determined by substituting “International Military Headquarters” for the 
“sending State” in the NATO SOFA, with the exemptions identified in the Paris Protocol. 
An International Military Headquarters is, through Article 4 of the Paris Protocol, 
considered a force, and, by extension, a sending State with certain obligations. In 
terms of crossing borders and legitimately staying in a receiving State, both the 
sending State and the International Military Headquarters must inform the receiving 
State when personnel are no longer part of an International Military Headquarters.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
nationality.  
30 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, listing the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement. 
31 For the drafting history of article III, paragraph 1 of the NATO SOFA, see MS-R(51)13 (published by Naval War 
College, Newport Rhode Island in NATO Agreements on Status: Travaux Prépaeatoires, edited and annotated by 
Professor Joseph M. Snee, 1961, International Law Studies). 
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The Paris Protocol, Article 4, paragraph c requires that the ID card issued by the 
sending State be presented upon the crossing of borders. This is because the military 
staff members (and the civilians in the employ of the sending State) remain 
representatives of their sending State and subject to the jurisdiction of that State; 
therefore, they should identify themselves accordingly. This does not, of course, 
change the status of the personnel as “attached to an International Military 
Headquarters” in the sense of Article 3 of the Paris Protocol.  
 
The Supplementary Agreement32 seeks to exempt members and their 
dependents from visa and immigration requirements, obligations associated with 
residency and registration, and from provisions regarding work permits under the host 
State law. The Supplementary Agreement additionally requires that a State hosting an 
International Military Headquarters issues the appropriate ID Cards to the members of 
the Headquarters and to their dependents to appropriately identify them as staff 
members of an international organisation. This is done to identify the staff as staying in 
the hosting State as staff members of an international organisation, but it does not 
afford them any further status or entitlements. The Agreement identifies that the stay in 
the hosting State is temporary33 and consistent with the national or international 
appointment and reliant on the relationship between the member and the 
International Military Headquarters. The temporality of the stay extends to the 
dependents of such a member.  
 
EC Regulation No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 (with later amendments34) identifies 
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement. This 
is not the only regulation relevant to the Schengen Acquis; therefore the review below 
covers both this provision and the regulations relevant to the crossing of borders and 
the legal effect of visa and residency in the EU context.  
 
Firstly, the 2001 Regulation recognises in the introduction, paragraph 8, that “[…] 
Member States may exempt certain categories of persons from the visa requirement 
or impose it on them in accordance with public international law or custom.” Where 
such exemptions are applied, Member States should communicate to the other 
Member States and to the Commission the measures which they take pursuant to this 
Regulation. For the same reasons, that information should also be published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. (2001 Regulation, introduction, 
paragraph 9). The 2001 Regulation provides in Article 4 that Member States may 
provide exemptions for diplomats and for members of “some international 
                                                          
32 For an example of a recent Supplementary Agreement, see the Supplementary Agreement concluded between 
Estonia, SHAPE, and HQ SACT in 2013: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/aktilisa/2140/5201/3002/NATO_HQ_engl.pdf 
33 In this regard, this inherent ‘temporality’ of the presence of international staff is consistent with the mission and 
nature of international organisations; as their raison d’être is to carry out their functions for an “international 
purpose.” This mandate will be carried out as long as it exists. However, this ‘temporality’ is also required for 
permitting international organisations to evolve, as only under the functional approach can these institutions 
prosper. This ‘temporality’ has, inter alia, manifested itself in the several forms of recruitment (the principle of 
‘précarité de l’emploi in international organisations’) practiced by international organisations, which facilitates 
reorganisations to be implemented in an agile manner and thus the Organisation to continue exercising its 
’international’ competence’. 
34 Regulation (EU) No 1289/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2010 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. Official Journal L 347, 
20/12/2013 P. 0074 – 0080.  
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organisations” issuing laissez-passer to staff members. This, logically, will be done 
differently by each of the Member States, depending on their respective international 
obligations. This is implemented in the 2006 Schengen Borders Code35 and subsequent 
Border Crossing Handbook.36 The 2006 Schengen Borders Code, Article 2 paragraph 
15, extends discretionary authority to the Member States to issue residence permits to 
third-country nationals. Member States are, by the same Article, required to notify the 
European Commission of the specimen of model cards so issued. The information is 
then published in the Official Journal of the European Union, C Series. Reviewing this 
Journal, there is a significant variety in the categories of groups that, by national 
decision, receive a residence permit. Several States assign status “with equivalent 
value of a residence permit”37 to members of diplomatic missions and to staff 
members of international organisations hosted by that State. Thus, Member States 
maintain national discretion to grant entry and stay and to provide a special ID card, 
a sticker, or similar means of identification. Under this procedure, a hosting State can 
facilitate the requirement of members of an International Military Headquarters and 
their dependents to travel to, from, and reside temporarily in a Schengen Member 
State.  
 
Reviewing the practice of affording status “with the equivalent value of a 
residence permit” as it is reported and published in the Official Journal accordance 
with Article 2, paragraph 15 of the Schengen Borders Code, it seems that the practice 
varies amongst EU Member States. As mentioned above, some States identify that 
special documents are issued “with equivalent value of a residence permit” to 
diplomatic personnel and to members of international organisations. Some Member 
States specifically stipulate that this status be applied to both the privileged members 
and to their accompanying dependents. Such cards or documents appear 
consistently to be issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the EU Member States. 
Regardless of the different practice in the EU Member States, what is relevant for this 
analysis is that, consistent with practice in international law, EU Member States de lege 
are not prevented from granting members of an international organisation and their 
dependents entry and temporary stay (temporary residency) as long as they comply 
with the procedures described above. 
 
In terms of members of a force (as opposed to members of an international 
military headquarters), the 2001 Regulation recognises the NATO SOFA, Article III as a 
special arrangement. This recognition is repeated in Annex VII of the Schengen Borders 
Code,38 which specifically references the waiver of passport and visa provided in the 
NATO (Partnership for Peace/PfP) SOFA39 for military members holding a valid national 
                                                          
35 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). Add 
OJ reference 
36 Commission Recommendation 7.11.2006, establishing a common ‘Practical Handbook for Border Guards 
(Schengen Handbook)’ to be used by Member States' competent authorities when carrying out the border control 
of persons; Commission Recommendation of 16.8.2010, amending the Recommendation establishing a common 
'Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook)' to be used by Member States' competent 
authorities when carrying out the border control of persons (C (2006) 5186 final). 
37 See footnote 7 above. 
38 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) - 
Community rules for carrying out the border control of persons, covering both border checks and surveillance. 
(Consolidated version, not official, published 2006R0562— EN— 05.04.2010 — 003.002— 1). 
39 Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other States participating in the 
Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of their Forces, dated 19 June 1995. 
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ID and a travel order. Nothing in the 2001 Regulation, the Borders Code or Visa 
Handbook40 prevents EU Member States from affording members of a force, a civilian 
component, or their dependents entry and temporary stay. Although the Schengen 
Borders Code facilitates border crossing and visa waiver procedures for military 
personnel, there have over the past years been some cases of practical difficulties in 
attaining documentation for non-EU civilians and dependents attached either to a 
visiting force or to an international military headquarters.  
 
This situation causes problems when persons are transiting through Schengen 
Member States and are required to present a valid permit to temporarily reside in the 
hosting NATO Member State. However, based on the review of the cited regulations, 
the practice identified in the Official Journal of the European Union, and especially the 
notifications provided by the Schengen Member States under the EU visa regime 
(including the quoted secondary law), EU Member States, as a matter of national 
decisions and based on their NATO obligations, can facilitate the entry and the 
temporary stay of both military and civilian staff and their dependents.  
 
This is in fact being done by some NATO / EU Member States. The Handbook for 
Visa Regulations, chapter 2.3 records visa exemptions “granted by Member States to 
members of the armed forces travelling on NATO or Partnership for Peace business 
and holders of identification and movement orders provided for by the Agreement of 
19 June 1951 between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation regarding 
the status of their forces”. The provision is accompanied by comments; the Norwegian 
and the Greek comments are particularly important here because they both extend 
the visa waiver of Article III of the NATO SOFA to civilian staff members and to 
dependents. The Greek comment includes civilians; the Norwegian41 comments 
instead extend the waiver to dependents of military personnel attached to an 
International Military Headquarters. Neither comments are considered to include all 
categories of NATO or PfP personnel, but what is rather important in this context is that 
NATO/Schengen Member States are permitted to take the necessary actions to 
facilitate entry, stay, and exit of the military and civilian members of an International 
Military Headquarters (and of NATO Agencies), and of their dependents under current 
EU regulations.42  
 
The effective means of entry and transit would thus depend on whether or not 
members of an International Military Headquarters and their dependents are identified 
as a special group under the Schengen Borders Code and whether the associated 
notification has been completed by the Schengen Member State hosting the 
Headquarters. Therefore, as the Schengen Borders Code, Annex VII paragraph 4.4, 
establishes a specific exception, the EU Member States hosting an International Military 
Headquarters are provided with a sufficient, legal mechanism to respect its 
                                                          
40 Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas based on COMMISSION 
DECISION C(2010) 1620 final of 19.3.2010 establishing the Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the 
modification of issued visas and COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION C (2011) 5501 final of 4.8.2011, particularly 
Annex 5: Information pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement. More NATO/EU Member States have submitted a statement identifying visa waiver 
for military personnel under the NATO (and PfP) SOFA.  
41 Norway is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and is one of the four non-EU countries 
participating in the Schengen cooperation; the other three are Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.  
42 Annex 5, paragraph. 2.3, lists the relevant comments. 
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international legal obligations towards the International Military Headquarters and, 
thus, NATO as a whole.  
 
Conclusion 
One of the less explored terrains in international institutional law is that of the 
relation between international organisations.43 Coordination between international 
organisations is desirable when their functions are either related or where they may 
overlap or affect the functions of other international organisations, be it directly or 
indirectly. In the case of NATO and EU, NATO is performing activities in territories where 
EU law enjoys primacy over national law. In the course of implementing the Paris 
Protocol, EU regulations are sometimes perceived as a limitation that has to be 
factored into the Supplementary Agreements, and the waiver of visa and of residency 
expressed in the Supplementary Agreement has in particular prompted questions in 
this regard. The authors have empirically explored this, and other areas (planned to be 
published) are object of EU regulations and directives and typically addressed in 
Agreements supplementing the Paris Protocol. The conclusion is consistently that both 
“regimes” are compatible, as the EU adopts legal principles and regulations in 
harmony with the existing international obligations of its member States. A separate 
discussion is that of the relation between posterior treaties and EU regulations when 
the former supplement anterior treaties, but that is considered to be outside the scope 
of this article and not relevant to the conclusion, since the assessment is that the EU 
develops its law on the premise of not prejudicing the obligations related to the 
existence and functioning of (other) international organisations, such as NATO. 
Consequently, and after having analysed the specific EU rules on visa and immigration 
in the context of the Paris Protocol and Supplementary Agreements, we conclude that 
EU secondary law recognises the special status enjoyed by NATO in particular and 
international organisations in general. In particular, EU law specifically identifies the 
specific status held by NATO. This status enables NATO forces and International Military 
Headquarters to carry out their designated functions within a NATO (and thus EU) 
member State. Additionally, the EU Acquis also recognises and bases itself on the 
functional immunities and privileges afforded to international organisations in 
international law. As such, the EU arguably has an inherent or organisational 
responsibility to facilitate EU nations’ efforts to comply with obligations originating from 
their memberships of international organisations, without compromising their EU 
responsibilities.44  
                                                          
43 H. G. Schermers, Niels M. Blokker, ibid, paragraph 1702. 
44 Additionally, NATO has a particularly prominent position in this regard, as the TEU dedicates Article 42, paragraph 
1, sub. 3, codifying the obligation of both the EU and its Member States to ensure that policy concluded under the 
Common Foreign Security Policy (with includes Defence Policy) (CFSP) does not interfere with the NATO obligations 
of EU Member States (‘The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain 
Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under 
the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that 
framework.’). Article 42 TEU clearly identifies that the EU has a duty to respect the NATO obligations of its Member 
States. The obligations undertaken under the North Atlantic Treaty go beyond that of responding to an armed 
attack and acting in collective self-defence (Article 5). The preamble reaffirms the faith of Parties to the Treaty in 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Additionally, Article 7 reminds that the Treaty will 
not affect any right or obligation under the Charter of the United Nations. Articles 2 and 4 promote interaction and 
development of relations; Article 3 direct Allies to ‘maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity’ 
and this is done through military cooperation which again relies broadly on the effective functioning of NATO 
International Military Headquarters and North Atlantic Council activated MOU Organisations, as well as efficient 
implementation of the NATO SOFA (and the PfP equivalent). The EU regulations reviewed here recognise the 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by international organisations and furthermore have, as illustrated in the 
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The present conclusion is further supported by the principle of the need for 
coordination between international institutions; this principle is recognised by the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU), which has explicitly acknowledged “the growing 
importance of international cooperation and of the consequent need to secure the 
proper functioning of international organisations”45 and more recently, in Kadi Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P where the court stated that “in the sphere of 
cooperation and development must be exercised in observance of the undertakings 
given in the context of the United Nations and other international organisations.”46 
 
Consequently, the Supplementary Agreement is not only consistent with 
secondary EU law as reviewed by the authors in the context of residence and visa 
requirements; it is also consistent with primary EU law and with public international law 
and its various elements at different levels. Therefore, EU Member States have no legal 
obstacles to conclude host or seat agreements and to grant functional immunities 
and privileges to international organisations. 
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implementation of the Schengen Acquis, accepted that EU rules are not intended to be an obstacle to the 
implementation of the NATO SOFA and the PfP SOFA. Moreover, TEU Article 42 must be understood in the context of 
the EU facilitation for permitting NATO carry out its functions and purposes as identified in the North Atlantic Treaty, 
which necessarily includes its functional immunities and privileges to be tailored to fit both the roles of Article 2, 
Article, 3, and Article 4 as they prepare the NATO member States to fulfil Article 5. The North Atlantic Treaty is 
drafted within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and particularly recognising the role of the 
Charter of the United Nations, but the language (“purpose and principles”) of the North Atlantic Treaty is carefully 
chosen as not all of the founding NATO member States at the time were members of the United Nations (see Lord 
Ismay, The First Five Years, Part 1, Chapter 2). As such, there is a clear linkage between the North Atlantic Treaty and 
the Charter of the United Nations. This relationship is separate from the relations established between NATO and its 
constituents, on one hand, and the United Nations, on the other hand, when NATO and NATO members carry out 
missions in response to a Security Council Resolution or otherwise implement Security Council Resolutions (in 
particular the application of Article 103; as reviewed in the Kadi Case before the ECJ and in the cases of Bahrami, 
Saramati, and Al-Jedda before the ECHR). Finally, it is necessary to understand the purposes of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and the cooperation undertaken by NATO member states consistent with the Treaty, which underpin the 
purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
45 (Bosphorus case 84/95, referring to ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC],no. 35763/97 and Waite and 
Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 72, ECHR1999-I. 
46 291: ‘“[…]the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers (Poulsen and Diva 
Navigation, paragraph 9, and Racke, paragraph 45), the Court having in addition stated, in the same paragraph 
of the first of those judgments, that a measure adopted by virtue of those powers must be interpreted, and its 
scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of international law.”292: Moreover, the Court has held that the 
powers of the Community provided for by Articles 177 EC to 181 EC in the sphere of cooperation and development 
must be exercised in observance of the undertakings given in the context of the United Nations and other 
international organisations (Case C-91/05 Commission v Council [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 65 and case-law 
cited). 
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NATO and EU Military Cooperation 
 
 by Siegfried Dohr1 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the 1990s the European Union has developed its competences and 
activities in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Despite differences in nature and approach, 
NATO and the EU both deal with matters of security and conduct crisis-management 
operations. 22 of the 28 NATO member states are also members of the EU.2 
 
The comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, which the EU 
High Representative and NATO Secretary General concluded on 17 March 2003, was 
a landmark in the relationship between the two organisations. This framework of 
relations built upon NATO's Washington Summit in 1999 and the conclusions of the 
European Council in Nice in December 2000 as well as the EU-NATO joint declaration 
of 16 December 2002. The EU has also established modalities to involve non-EU 
European NATO members like Iceland, Norway and Turkey in EU-led operations.  
 
The EU and NATO have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well 
established and deeply-rooted. For this partnership to work both organisations must 
ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency at all times. This 
partnership is also about ensuring efficient crisis management and coordination of 
efforts in order to identify the best possible response to a crisis. For this purpose, the EU 
and NATO agreed on mutual crisis consultation arrangements that are geared 
towards an efficient and rapid decision-making process in each organisation in the 
presence of a crisis. Such EU-NATO consultations involve the EU's Political and Security 
Committee and NATO's North Atlantic Council, the EU and NATO Military Committees, 
as well as the EU High Representative and NATO Secretary General.  
 
Legal Framework 
When a given crisis gives rise to an EU-led operation making use of NATO assets 
and capabilities, the EU and NATO will draw on the so-called "Berlin Plus 
arrangements"3. These arrangements cover one or more of three main elements that 
are directly connected to operations:  
 
1. EU access to NATO planning;  
2. NATO European command options; and  
                                                          
1 Siegfried Dohr worked as Legal Adviser at the European Union Staff Group located in Mons from September to 
December 2013. Prior to this assignment, he served as Company Commander (1999), Claims Officer (2004) and 
Legal Adviser (2012) at SFOR and EUFOR. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may 
not represent the views of NATO.  
2 6 of the 28 EU member states are not members of NATO (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden). 
3 Berlin Plus agreement is the short title of comprehensive package of agreements made between NATO an EU 
after the 1996 Berlin summit which saw the official start of WEU-NATO cooperation. 
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3. Use of NATO assets and capabilities.  
 
Firstly, NATO guarantees that the EU has access to NATO planning.4 At the early 
stages, before it is known whether an operation will commence, NATO may contribute 
(by SHAPE in Mons) to the work carried out by the EU Military Staff on the definition of 
options (these are known as "military strategic options"). Subsequently, should the 
operation take place with the use of NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will then 
provide the operational planning required.  
 
Secondly, the EU may request that NATO makes available a NATO-European 
command option5 for an EU-led military operation. In this case, Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is the EU Operation Commander. He will remain at 
SHAPE where he would establish the EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ). The remaining 
command elements determined by the EU (such as the EU Force Commander and EU 
Force Headquarters deployed in theatre or the EU Component Commands) may 
either be provided by NATO or by EU Member States.  
 
Thirdly, the EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities. To this end, 
NATO has established a first list of its assets and capabilities that NATO would likely 
make available to the EU should the EU need them. In addition, NATO has defined a 
number of principles as well as financial and legal considerations applicable to the 
release of its assets and capabilities to the EU. On this basis, a specific EU-NATO 
agreement setting out the conditions for use of NATO assets and capabilities is drafted 
for a given operation. Such agreement specifically provides for a possible recall of 
assets due to unforeseen circumstances, for example, due to the emergence of a 
NATO Article 5 contingency (an attack against a NATO member).  
 
Another important element of the EU-NATO relationship is related to the 
development of military capabilities. More specifically, it is about how the EU and 
NATO and their Member States should develop in a mutually reinforcing way and 
deliver the military capabilities they need for crisis management. It addresses the way 
in which the EU and NATO could cooperate to fulfil those capabilities where both 
organisations have the same requirements and similar shortfalls. Work is currently 
underway to improve the synergy between the EU and NATO in certain capabilities 
areas where both have pilot projects. 
 
EU-NATO relations proved to work well in connection with the first ever EU-led 
military operation. This was Operation CONCORDIA6 in the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia7, in which the EU used NATO assets and capabilities and where the EU 
Operation Commander was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR).  
 
                                                          
4 Exchange of Letters between NATO and the EU on the Compilation of the Results of the Work on NATO-EU 
Relations, SG (2003)0355, 17 March 2003; Document five: “Assured EU Access to NATO Planning Capabilities able to 
contribute to Military Planning for EU-led Operations”(MC-198-2). 
5 Ibid. Document nine: “Report on the European Role of DSACEUR (PO(2003)10)” and Document 10: “Memorandum 
on Identifying Main Elements of NATO’s European Command Options for EU-led Operations” (SG(2003)0155). 
6 UNSCRes 1371 adopted unanimously on 26 September 2001, after reaffirming resolutions 1244 (1999) and 1345 
(2001) on the situation in the former Yugoslavia including Macedonia, the Council called for the full implementation 
of its Resolution 1345 concerning violence and terrorist activities in Macedonia and southern Serbia. 
7 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name (SHAPE, SHGDS/801/07 from 08 May 
2007). 
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Before and during the second EU-led military operation, ARTEMIS8 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (an operation conducted solely by the EU), NATO was 
regularly informed of the EU’s intentions, in full respect of the spirit and of the letter of 
the crisis consultation arrangements. The second mission conducted under the Berlin 
Plus arrangements took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. In June 2004 NATO 
decided to end its SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) mission and 
the EU Council agreed to launch a European military operation (EUFOR ALTHEA)9 as 
part of a global policy aimed at stabilising the country. On 22 November 2004, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1575 authorising the deployment 
of EUFOR ALTHEA under Chapter VII.10 Once again DSACEUR was appointed 
Operational Commander of the EU operation. 
 
The Berlin Plus arrangements are based on principles which improve the 
cooperation, interoperability and employment of the EU and NATO forces. 
These guiding principles are: 
• When EU are using NATO common assets and capabilities the arrangements should 
be separable but not separate, allowing the EU to be easily identified and visible. 
• EU and NATO, in the build up of their individual forces, should avoid unnecessary 
duplications and must coordinate in a common effort (more efficient use of funds). 
• The source of forces for both EU and NATO are common, with some exceptions, but 
will be aligned to either command, according to the operational needs. 
 
EU - Common Security and Defence Policy 
The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)11 include 
the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a 
common defence.12 The CSDP allows the European Union to develop its civilian and 
military capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at the international 
level, thus helping to maintain peace and international security in accordance with 
the United Nations Charter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 UNSCRes 1484 (2003) adopted unanimously on 30 May 2003, after recalling previous resolutions on the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council authorised Operation Artemis in Bunia, 
the capital of Ituri Province, amid the deteriorating security situation in the area. 
9 Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP adopted by the Council on 12. July 2004; NATO Headquarters Sarajevo 
continued beyond this date as a NATO mission, tasked to support in the defence reform area. 
10 UNSCRes 1575 adopted unanimously on 22 November 2004, after recalling previous resolutions on the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including resolutions 1031 (1995), 1088 (1996), 1423 (2002), 1491 (2003) 
and 1551 (2004), the Council defined the role of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a legal 
successor to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). 
11 The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the ESDP to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
12 Article 24 TEU (ex Art. 11 TEU). 
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Military and civilian missions in 2013:13
 
 Civilian missions 
 Military missions 
 
Troop Numbers of Military Missions and Operations: 
EUTM SOMALIA 126 
EUTM MALI 500 
EUFOR ALTHEA 800 
EUNAFOR ATALANTA 1400 
 
Conduct of EU Operations 
The European Union’s CSDP crisis management missions are executed in 
accordance with the UN Charter and, in some cases, in cooperation with NATO. The 
EU has adopted a concept of three options for commanding EU operations: 
 
Option one is to use facilities provided by one of the 5 Operation HQs currently 
available in EU member states (French OHQ in Mont Valerien, Paris; UK OHQ in 
Northwood; German OHQ in Potsdam, Berlin; Italian OHQ in Rome and Greek OHQ in 
Larissa). 
                                                          
13 http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm. (22. 11.2013). 
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Option two, effective from 1 Jan 2007, is to use the EU Operations Centre in 
Brussels, which commands missions and operations of limited size (up to a Battle Group 
of about 2,000 troops). 
 
Option three is through recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities, 
under the Berlin Plus arrangements. This includes use of the NATO command and 
control assets such as Operation Headquarters located at SHAPE. This option is 
currently used for the EU-led Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
NATO 
EU 
MS National 
OHQs 
EU 
Ops Centre SHAPE 
OHQ 
 Command and Control 
 NATO Planning Capabilities 
 Communication and 
Information System 
 Intelligence systems 
 Infrastructure 
Berlin Plus guiding principles: 
 Separable but not separate 
 No unnecessary duplication 
 One set of forces 
 
 
EUMS EUMC 
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1 2 3 
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EU OHQ at SHAPE 
The EUSG supports DSACEUR in his role as Operation Commander, in the 
conduct of the EU-led Operation ALTHEA. It draws upon EU doctrines and procedures, 
and brings the necessary EU perspective, thereby providing the essential EU expertise 
and connectivity. 
 
Operational planning at the strategic level is the main focus. OHQ updates the 
operational plans as required in coordination with NATO Strategic Operational 
Planning Group.  
 
The OHQ is also responsible for Force Generation and Manning issues. The aim is 
to ensure that the quantity and quality of troops, and the Crisis Establishment (CE) 
organisation (for the Force HQ) and functions, including those elements shared with 
NATO Headquarters Sarajevo (NHQ Sa), are aligned in accordance with the OPLAN 
and Force List (Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) in NATO terms). 
 
The OHQ is the link between EUFOR and the Special Committee of Athena.14 
ATHENA's legal basis was amended most recently in December 2011.15 
 
The OHQ reports on a weekly and bi-monthly basis to the EU about the political 
and security situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and prepares the Six-Monthly Review 
(SMR).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 ATHENA is a mechanism which administers the financing of common costs of EU operations having military or 
defence implications. It does so on behalf of EU Member States contributing to the financing of EU military 
operations. ATHENA was set up by the Council of the European Union on 1st March 2004. 
15http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/common-security-and-defence-policy-(csdp)/financing-of-csdp-
military-operations (09.12.2013) 
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EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA) 
The military operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was launched on 
2 December 2004 and has contributed to the maintenance of a safe and secure 
environment in BiH. The EU decision to launch Op ALTHEA followed the decision by 
NATO to conclude its SFOR operation and the adoption by the UN Security Council of 
resolution 1575 authorizing the deployment of an EU force in BiH. In the framework of 
Op ALTHEA, the EU initially deployed 7000 troops. In light of the improving security 
situation, Op ALTHEA has been reconfigured four times and continues to act in 
accordance with its peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, as specified in the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2123 (2013). 
 
The main objectives of Operation ALTHEA are: 
• To provide support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH; 
• To provide capacity-building and training support to the Armed Forces of BiH 
(AFBiH); and 
• To support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH. 
 
EUFOR ALTHEA supports the implementation of a number of residual tasks that 
have been transferred from the operation to local authorities, such as: countermining 
activities, control of military and civilian movement of weapons, control of ammunition 
and explosive substances, as well as management of weapons and ammunition 
storage sites.  
 
EUFOR ALTHEA retains its presence throughout the country through Liaison and 
Observation Teams (LOTs) and has manoeuvre units, based in Camp Butmir, Sarajevo, 
to react to security challenges throughout the country; it also has a credible reserve 
force to draw upon. The contributing states are: 18 EU Member States, Albania, Chile, 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia16, Switzerland and Turkey. 
 
LOTs structure and strength (17 LOTs: 130 members; LOT Coordination Center-
LCC: 14 members):17 
 
 
                                                          
16 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 
17 http://www.euforbih.org.  
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Conclusion 
Today, there are several lingering questions regarding the Berlin Plus 
agreements. Only two out of all EU-led operations have been conducted under Berlin 
Plus. When the two organisations are engaged simultaneously in the same theatre of 
operations, the sharing of classified information poses a problem.  
 
To ensure optimum operational cooperation it is necessary to go beyond the 
Berlin Plus agreements which do not cover the whole range of EU-NATO cooperation 
scenarios. An important step in this direction was done by NATO Secretary General 
Fogh Rasmussen who attended the last meeting of EU foreign and defence ministers 
on 19 November 2013. Mr. Fogh Rasmussen called for closer ties between EU and 
NATO “to coordinate, not duplicate” and to ensure that the two organisations 
complement each other’s efforts. The Secretary General stated that “we need to 
develop capacities, not bureaucracies; to commit to investing in security in those 
areas where we all need more capabilities, such as drones for surveillance, 
intelligence and reconnaissance, heavy transport and air-to-air refuelling.”  
 
 
*** 
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Book Review: International Law and the Classification of 
Conflicts, by Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.)1 
By Vincent Roobaert2 
 The law of armed conflict can be divided into two 
branches: one governing international armed conflicts and 
another setting out fewer and more lenient rules governing 
non-international armed conflicts.  
 
This distinction first appeared and can still be found in 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Although the Geneva 
Conventions mainly cover international armed conflicts, they 
contain a Common Article 3 setting out minimum rules 
applicable to “armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.” In 1977, the second Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions prescribed a more extensive set 
of rules applicable in internal armed conflicts. Unfortunately, 
the second Additional Protocol sets out a rather high 
threshold for its applicability, and thus may not be applicable in practice. As the 
second Additional Protocol will not be applied in situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, this raises challenges in determining the rules applicable to a specific 
conflict. The act of determining which legal framework is applicable to a specific 
situation is called classification. 
 
Mrs. Wilmshurst, in her book, explores the difficulties arising from the classification 
of conflicts, both in theoretical and practical terms, through a number of very 
valuable contributions. The book starts with an examination of the changing nature of 
armed conflict by Steven Haines. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has 
witnessed conflicts that were much more complex than ever before. While recent 
history provides various cases of international armed conflicts, the number of internal 
armed conflicts significantly prevails. The complexity of these situations has been 
accentuated by foreign intervention but also by the participation of new non-state 
actors such as transnational terrorism groups or organized crime. The typology of 
conflicts is also more complex. Today, one hears of non-legally defined terms like 
insurrection, irregular and/or simply hybrid warfare.  
 
As the two excellent subsequent contributions by Mr. Akande and Mrs. Pejic 
show, classification does have serious consequences for parties and persons involved 
in the conflict. It determines not only the rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities 
but also, for instance, rules applicable in detention. 
 
                                                          
1 E. Wilmshurst, International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
2 Assistant Legal Adviser, NCI Agency. The views expressed in this review are solely those of the author and may not 
represent the views of NATO and the NCI Agency. 
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As further evidence of the complexity of classification, the book continues with 
10 case studies covering Northern Ireland, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Colombia, Afghanistan, Gaza, South Ossetia, Iraq, Lebanon, the war against Al-
Qaeda, and future conflicts. The case studies are built on the same canvas, that is, on 
an examination of how the parties to the conflict considered the issue of classification, 
along with the views of the author of the contribution. The case studies have been 
carefully selected to cover a wide range of situations, including armed conflicts whose 
nature changed during the conflict (e.g. following a foreign intervention – a case of 
Afghanistan since 2001).  
 
After reading the contributions, one understands what a daunting task the 
classification of modern conflict can be. Indeed, it is striking to note that deciding on 
the proper classification may require the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of 
facts that may not all be available at the beginning of the conflict. The challenge is 
increased in the case of multinational operations, such as those carried out under the 
auspices of NATO or the European Union, where the participants may not all be parties 
to the same international treaties. This raises the question of the remaining relevance 
of the distinction between non-international (internal) and international armed 
conflicts. It also explains why some nations have moved away from this classification 
and have decided as a matter of policy to apply some of the rules applicable to 
international armed conflicts in non-international armed conflict, as well. 
 
Mrs. Wilmshurst's book has gathered very valuable contributions from 
distinguished academics in the field of armed conflict. Her book is a welcome and 
valuable addition to the literature on the law of armed conflict. Thanks to the inclusion 
of the case studies, the book has managed to move away from a purely academic 
monograph to become an exceptionally useful tool to assist nations and their 
operational lawyers when making classification decisions. It therefore deserves the 
attention of students, academics and practitioners alike. 
 
*** 
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Name: Svein Lystrup 
Rank/Service/Nationality: OF-4/NAVY/NORWAY 
Job title: Chief Legal Adviser, NSHQ 
Primary legal focus of effort: Supporting COM NSHQ with all 
legal aspects concerning the headquarters 
Likes: Swimming, cars and good food 
Dislikes: Bad weather and vacuuming  
When in Mons everyone should: take the time to walk in the 
city centre and discover all the nice buildings, alleys, history 
and restaurants the city has to offer. 
Best NATO experience: Legal adviser to COM CTF 508 
(Counter Piracy Operation Ocean Shield) in 2013 
My one recommendation for the NATO Legal Community:  
The NATO legal community isn’t very big, and I therefore 
believe that it is important to build relations within it in order 
to benefit from each other’s expertise 
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Name: Patrick Hill 
Rank/Service/Nationality: Canadian civilian 
Job title: Senior Assistant Legal Adviser, NATO HQ 
Primary legal focus of effort: So far, staffing issues, 
contracting, privileges and immunities, treaty law - and 
whatever else is in the inbox.  
Likes: Running, good food, Belgian beer (best if enjoyed in 
that order!) 
Dislikes: Bureaucratic wrangles 
When in Brussels everyone should: go for a run, walk or bike 
in the Foret de Soignes. It is a treasure. 
Best NATO experience: The variety of work, the good 
people, and the importance of NATO’s mission. What more 
could a lawyer ask for?  
My one recommendation for the NATO Legal Community: 
Share! 
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Name: PREVOTEAU, Jean-Luc 
Rank/Service/Nationality: Captain/French Air Force 
Job title: NCI Agency, Assistant Legal adviser 
Primary legal focus of effort: NATO communication and 
Information Agency (NCI agency) Legal Office 
Likes: Law of Armed Conflicts/International Law/Diplomacy 
Dislikes: Not being on the field- Be a bookworm 
When in Brussels everyone should:  
- Walk and get lost in the streets of the districts of 
Sablons and Marolles (Brussels city centre); 
- Have some local food at the restaurant called “Le 
clan des Belges” near the place Saint-Boniface 
(Brussels city centre). 
Best NATO experience: Legal Adviser for French Air 
operations in ISAF  
My one recommendation for the NATO Legal Community:  
Share information and meet as frequently as possible
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Name: Rohel Gregory 
Rank/Service/Nationality: OR7 / Army / France 
Job title: NCI Agency Legal Office, Administrative Assistant 
Primary legal focus of effort: Ease the lawyers’ tasks 
Likes: Honesty and frankness 
Dislikes: Zeppelin guys: Very huge people but full of air! 
When in danger everyone should: not be afraid, because 
the fear only exists in your head. 
Best NATO experience: NATO Multi sensor intelligence 
brigade. 
My one recommendation for the NATO Legal Community: 
Cooperation in information sharing. 
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…FAREWELL 
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UPCOMING EVENTS OF LEGAL INTEREST… 
…in NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany: 
 
May 2014 will be a busy month in the NATO School for the 
Legal Advisers interested in the NATO Legal Regime. They will have 
the unique opportunity to attend the NATO Legal Advisers’ course, 
and the NATO Operational Law Course, which are organised in two 
consecutive weeks. 
The NATO Legal Advisers’ Course, from 12 to 16 May 2014, aims to provide 
military and civilian legal advisers, in national or NATO billets, an understanding of legal 
aspects of NATO operations and activities. Note that the Legal Advisers’ Course is also 
taking place from 6 to 10 October 2014. 
The NATO Operational Law Course, from 19 to 23 May 2014, aims to provide in-
depth training and practical exercises focused on legal issues faced during NATO 
military operations. 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Co-sponsored by the US Naval War College, the NATO School in 
Oberammergau also hosts the NATO Maritime Operations Law 
Seminar, from 28 July to 1 August 2014. 
The Seminar will provide military and civilian legal advisers in 
national or NATO billets with an introduction to international legal 
norms for maritime security, NATO policy and doctrine for naval 
operations, and public international law as it applies to peacetime and armed conflict 
operations at sea. 
To register, please use this link: https://www.natoschool.nato.int/conferences.asp 
------------------------------------------ 
For more information related to all the above advertised events, please visit 
NATO School web page at: https://www.natoschool.nato.int  
 
 *** 
...in Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence: 
The CCD COE in Tallinn, Estonia organises a Seminar on 
International Law of Cyber Operations, from 9 to 12 June 2014 that will give an in-depth 
overview of the application of the jus ad bellum and international humanitarian law to 
cyber operations. The Seminar is immediately following the annual International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict. 
The Seminar is also offered jointly by the CCD COE, NATO School 
Oberammergau and U.S. Naval War College, on 21-25 July 2014 in the NATO School, 
Oberammergau, Germany.  
For more info please visit the CCD COE web page: http://ccdcoe.org/352.html 
and the NATO School web page at: 
https://www.natoschool.nato.int/new_www/courses/CyberSeminarFlyer2014.pdf; 
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*** 
... by the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow 
Waters: 
The COE CSW organises the 2nd Conference on Operational 
Maritime Law, in Rome, Italy, from 19 to 23 May 2014. This conference 
will emphasize legal issues in Maritime Security, address legal positions 
from experts current in supporting naval operations, identify future 
fields of naval operations and train legal advisors prior to deployment to Maritime 
Security Operations, including anti-piracy and anti-terrorism missions. 
Registrations will be accepted until 1st May 2014 via e-mail to 
legalconference@coecsw.org.  
 
 
 
...of NOTE 
 
 
 Useful information on the NATO- EU Relations 
can be found on the NATO Multimedia Library web 
page: http://natolibguides.info/nato-eu 
 
 
 The NATO Legal Gazette can also be found on the official 
ACT web page : http://www.act.nato.int/publications  
 
 
 
Disclaimer : The NATO Legal Gazette is published by Allied Command Transformation/Staff Element Europe 
and contains articles written by Legal Staff working at NATO, Ministries of Defence, and selected authors . 
However, this is not a formal N ATO document and therefore may not represent the official opinions or 
positions of NATO or individual governments 
